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Such testimony is incapable of establishing “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, [Robinson] would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” See C (quotation omitted).

In the context of a guilty plea, a defendant must show, “a reasonable possibility that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Campos v. State , (quotation omitted).

Under the second Strickland prong, appellant must show prejudice by “demonstrat[ing] a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” d 480, 486 (Minn. 2012) (quotation omitted).

16 errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” (quotation omitted).

See, e.g. , (recognizing that 2008 and 2009 supreme court opinion s were abrogated by Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141 (2013)); (recognizing that 1998 supreme court opinion was abrogated by Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010)).

Under the Strickland standard as applied in the context of a guilty plea, a defendant must demonstrate (1) “counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” and (2) “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, [s]he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” ( quotations omitted).

“A Supreme Court holding constitutes a new rule within the meaning of Teague if it breaks new ground, imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal Government, or was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant’s conviction became final.” (quotation omitted).

To prevail on an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim in the context of a guilty plea, the defendant must “demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” d 480, 486 (Minn. 2012) (quotation omitted).

Heard points out that, under the Teague standard, old rules of law “apply both on direct and collateral review.” (quotation omitted).

§ 1227(a)(2)(iii) (2018) (providing that a non-citizen convicted of an “aggravated felony at any time after admission is deportable”); (stating that a Minnesota simple robbery conviction was an aggravated felony for federal immigration purposes).

“We review a district court’s decision to deny a withdrawal motion for abuse of discretion, reversing only 7 in the ‘rare case.’” Raleigh, d at 97 ()

In the context of a guilty plea, a defendant may establish prejudice by showing “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” (quotation omitted).

See Campos v. State , (recognizing finality of conviction as threshold issue for retroactivity analysis); O’Meara v. State , (noting a case is final when “the availability of appea l [has been] exhausted, the time for a petition for certiorari has elapsed or a petition for certiorari

10 ( abrogated in part by Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 374 (2010) ); see also Campos v. State

In the context of a guilty plea, such as this, a defendant must demonstrate that “but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” (quotation omitted).

2010), including immigration consequences, Campos v. State , -83 (Minn. 2012) (stating that in Padilla, the United States Supreme Court held that a person’s constitutional rights “include[] the right to be informed a bout the deportation consequences of a guilty plea”).

Chavez-Nelson, d at 67 1 (quotation omitted); Campos v. State

In the context of a plea withdraw al, the defendant can establish prejudice by showing “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Campos v. State , (quotation omitted).

See, –99 (Minn. 2012); Johnson II, d at 622–23.

Campos v. State , 2 The holding in Campos controls our analysis here.

pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” d 480, 486 (Minn. 2012) (citing Hill v. Lockhart , 474 U.S. 52, 59, 106 S. Ct. 366, 371 (1985)).

To show prejudice, Ho must demonstrate “a reasonable probab ility that, but for counsel’s errors, he would have not pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Campos v. State , (quotation omitted).

Regarding the second prong, a petitioner must demonstrate “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” (quotation omitted).

To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, Boateng must establish both that his counsel’s representation was unreasonably substandard and that there is “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” (quotation omitted).

Even if we were to consider his ineffective -assistance-of-counsel claim, Ilogu has failed to sustain his burden of showing “that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,” and that there is “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Campos v. State , ( first quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 104 S. Ct. 2052 , 2064 (1984); then quoting Hill v. Lockhart

The Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in Campos v. State , supports our conclusion that it is truly clear that aggravated robbery is considered an aggravated felony under the INA.

Campos v. State , , 485 (Minn. 2012).

.4 We apply the standard from Teague v. Lane, 4 The retroactivity analysis is done only if a conviction was final before the new rule was announced.

In the context of a guilty plea, a defendant must demonstrate that “but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Campos v. State , (quotation omitted).

n.2, 500 (Minn. 2012), the supreme court remanded the question of whether the defendant properly received the rule 15.01 advisory because the plea petition containing the standa rd immigration advisory was not in the record and because neither defense counsel nor the district court questioned the defendant on

488 n.6 (Minn. 2012) (concluding that conviction of post-conviction petitioner who did not file direct appeal became final at expiration of 90-day period for direct appeal); O’Meara, d at 340 (same).