Cited by

-06 (Minn. 2019); n.5 (Minn. 2018); -48 (Minn. 2007).

right to a speedy trial because there was no demonstrable prejudice to his defense); (“Although three of the four Barker factors weigh in favor of finding a speedy-trial violation, those factors are substantially outweighed by the complete lack of prejudice resulting from the brief pretrial delay in this case.”), aff’d on other grounds

P. 11.09(b); (noting that appellant demanded a speedy trial at his omnibus hearing), aff’d

“The state also has the burden to establish the proper classification of a prior offense for inclusion in a criminal-history score.” aff’d

being classified as gross misdemeanors.” (quotation omitted); see also Act of May 22, 2016, ch. 160, § 7, 2016 Minn. Laws 576, 583–85 (codified at Minn. Stat. § 152.025 (2016)).

d 563, 573 (Minn. App. 2018), aff’ d

-10 (Minn. 2019) (concluding that prior fifth-degree controlled- substance possession offense could not be classified as a felony when calculating the criminal-history score for sentencing on a new conviction); see also Minn. Sent’g Guidelines 2.B.111 (2016) (“When an offender was convicted of a felony but wa

aff’d, d 303 (Minn. 2019).

“We apply the same principles of interpretation to the Guidelines as we apply to statutes, including the canons of statutory interpretation set forth in Minn. Stat. 645.08 [(2022)].” -07 (Minn. 2019).

d 303, 305-06 (Minn. 2019); n.5 (Minn. 2018); State 9 v. Maurstad

used at appellant’s sentencing hearing, the proper remedy is to remand the matter and give the state the opportunity “to further develop the sentencing record so that the district court can appropriately make its determination.” rev. denied (Minn. July 15, 2008); aff’d

d 303, 306 (Minn. 2019).

However, a prosecutor must be diligent in attempting to make witnesses available and the unavailability must not prejudice the defendant.” (quotation omitted), aff’d

In doing so, “we apply the same principles of interpretation to the Guidelines as we apply to statutes.” -07 (Minn. 2019).

We have stated that “the state’s additional opportunity to prepare for trial as a result of pretrial delay does not constitute prejudice to the defendant sufficient to support a finding of a speedy-trial violation under the fourth Barker factor.” aff’d

-10 (Minn. 2019) (stating that when calculating a criminal-history score, a pre-2016 fifth-degree possession offense is counted as a felony if it would be a felony under current law).

3 (emphasis added); (instructing that we should avoid interpretations that render words in a statute superfluous).

aff’d, d 303 (Minn. 2019).

(explaining that “[u]nder the State’s interpretation, paragraph b would do no work”).

-36 (Minn. 1986); d 563, 573 (Minn. App. 2018), aff’d

aff’d, (noting that “the stress, anxiety and inconvenience experienced by anyone who is involved in a trial is insufficient to demonstrate prejudice” (quotation omitted)).

State v. Strobel , aff’d

Appellant thus “has not identified any heightened pretrial anxiety or concern that would suggest a constitutional violation.” aff’d, d 303 (Minn. 2019).

Guidelines 2.B.7.a; see State v. Strobel , 308–10 (Minn. 2019) (interpreting Minnesota Sentencing Guideline 2.B.7.a and affirming “that the classification of a prior offense is determined by reference to the s tatute setting forth the elements of the crime”).

(“Presumptive prejudice does not require any particular showing of harm but results only from excessive delay.” (quotation omitted)), aff’d

Stated slightly differently, “ [a] defendant’s criminal history score is calculated, in part, by allotting ‘points’ for each of a defendant’s prior convictions for which a felony sentence was imposed.” d 563, 574 (Minn. App. 2018), aff’d, (quotation omitted) .

State v. Strobel , aff’d on other grounds

(affording different meanings for two terms used in a statute where the context of the statute made that clear); (“Because the meaning of a phrase often depends on how it is being used in the context of the statute, we examine words and phrases

n.5 (Minn. 2018) (); n.1 (Minn. App. 2018) (“[A] sentence based on an incorrect criminal-history sc ore is an illegal sentence th at may be corrected on direct appeal, regardless of whether the defendant objected to the score at sentencing.”), aff’d

review of a defendant’s criminal-history score may not be forfeited, because “a sentence based on an incorrect criminal-history score is an illegal sentence that may be corrected on direct appeal, regardless of whether the defendant objected to the score at sentencing ,” State v. Strobel , n.1 (Minn. Ap p. 2018), aff’d

“We review determinations of a defenda nt’s criminal history 9 score for abuse of discretion.” (quotation omitted), aff’d