Cited by

(citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 530).

We may invoke our supervisory powers to ensure the fair administration of justice, but do so only in rare cases See

Speedy Trial Violation The right to a speedy trial is as “fundamental as any of the rights secured by the Sixth Amendment.” State v. Windish , (quoting Klopfer v. North Carolina , 386 U.S. 213, 223, 87 S. Ct .

(citing Barker v. Wingo , 407 U.S. 514, 530-33, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 2192-93 (1972)).

State v. Windish , -16 (Minn. 1999).

Griffin, d at 340 (-16 (Minn. 1999)).

See State v. Taylor , State v. Windish

State v. Windish , 5 (citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530-33, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 2192-93 (1972)).

These factors are: “(1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) whether the defendant asserted his or her right to a speedy trial; and (4) whether the delay prejudiced the defendant.” (citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 2192 (1972)) .

Minnesota courts consider “(1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) whether the defendant asserted his or her right to a spee dy trial; and (4) whether the delay prejudiced the defendant.”

These factors are: “(1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) whether the defendant asserted his or her right to a speedy trial; and (4) whether the delay prejudiced the defendant.”

“Normally, the unavailability of a witness constitutes good cause for delay.”

This factor is a “triggering mechanism which determines whether further review is necessary.” (quotation omitted).

The four factors are “(1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) whether the defendant asserted his or her right to a speedy trial; and (4) whether the delay prejudiced the defendant.” (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 530-33, 92 S. Ct. at 2192- 93).

State v. Windish , , 315 (Minn. 1999) (citing Barker , 407 U.S. at 530-33, 92 S.Ct.

“In Minnesota, delays beyond 60 days from the date of demand raise a presumption that a violation [of the right to a speedy trial] has occurred.” -16 (Minn. 1999); see also Minn. R. Crim.

Rather, they are related factors and must be considered together with such other circumstances as may be relevant.” (quotation omitted).

We use a four-factor balanc ing test to determine whether a delay in a case violated the speedy-trial right and consider “(1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) whether the defendant assert ed his or her right to a speedy trial; and (4) whether the delay prejudiced the defendant.” State v. Windish , (citing Barker v. Wingo , 407 U.S. 514, 92 S. Ct. 2182 (1972)).

I. Length of Delay “The length of the delay is a ‘triggeri ng mechanism’ which determines whether further review is necessary.” (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S. Ct. at 2192).

Rather, they are related factors and must be considered together with such other circumstances as may be relevant.” (quotation omitted).

A. Length of the delay “The length of the delay is a ‘triggering mechanism’ which determines whether further review is necessary.” State v. Windish

Length of delay “The length of the delay is a ‛triggering mechanism’ which determines whether further review [of the Barker factors] is necessary.” State v. Windish

A. Length of the delay “The length of the delay is a ‘triggering mechanism’ which determines whether further review is necessary.” (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S. Ct. at 2192) .

(citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530–32, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 2192–93 (1972)).

right to a speedy trial; and (4) whether the delay prejudiced the defendant.” (citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530-33, 92 S. Ct. 2182, 2192-93 (1972)).

that could be construed as the assertion of the speedy trial right.” d 311, 317 (Minn. 1999) (quotation omitted).

318 (Minn. 1999) (quotation omitted).