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Under the Minnesota Constitution, a seizure occurs when, given the totality of the circumstances, “a reasonable person in the defendant’s shoes would have concluded that he or she was not free to leave.” (explaining that article I, section 10 of the Minnesota Constitution provides greater protection than the Fourth Amendment, under which a seizure only occurs when the police use physical force or a person submits to a show of authority by the police).

d 353, 364 (Minn. 2004) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. 1 , 88 S. Ct. 1868).

The principles and framework of Terry govern the “reasonableness of seizures during traffic stops even when a minor law has been violated.” State v. Askerooth

“[E]ach incremental intrusion during a stop must be ‘strictly tied to and justified by the circumstances which rendered [the initiation of the stop ] permissible.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19, 88 S. Ct. at 1878) (other quotation marks omitted).

See, e.g. , State v. Blacksten , , 846-47 (Minn. 1993) ; State v. Askerooth , , 371 (Minn. 2004) (Russell A. Anderson, J., concurring specially); see also United States v. Sharpe , 470 U.S. 675 , 683, 105 S. Ct. 1568 , 1573-574, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985).

“[E]ach incremental intrusion during [an investigative] stop must be ‘strictly tied to and justified by the circumstances which rendered the initia tion of the stop permissible.’” 6 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19, 88 S. Ct. at 1878) (other quotation omitted).

A traffic stop occurs “when a reasonable person in the defendant’s shoes would not feel free to leave.”

In the second step, we must inquire whether the officer’s actions during the stop “were reasonably related to and justified by the circumstances that gave rise to the [stop] in the first place.” Klamar, d at 691- 92 (quotation omitted); see also State v. Askerooth , 8 (quotations omitted) (“ [E]ach incremental intrusion during a stop must be strictly tied to and justified by the circumstances which rendered the initiation of the stop permissible.”).

To be constitutional, “each incremental intrusion during a tr affic stop [must] be tied to and justified by one of the following: (1) the original legitimate purpose of the stop, (2) independent probable cause, or (3) reasonableness, as defined in Terry.”

“[E]ach incremental intrusion during a stop must be ‘strictly tied to and justified by the circumstances which rendered the initiation of the stop permissible.’” (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19, 88 S. Ct. at 1878) (other quotation omitted).

State v. Askerooth , , 359 (Minn. 2004).

“An intrusion not closely related to the initial justification for the search or seizure is invalid under article I, section 10 unless there is independent p robable cause or reasonableness to justify that particular intrusion.” State v. Askerooth

(holding that a stop must be constitutional at its inception).

[would] ‘warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief’ that the action taken was appropriate.” (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22, 88 S. Ct. at 1880).

(quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19, 88 S. Ct. at 1868).

See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20–22, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1879–80 (1968); see also State v. Askerooth , (applying the Terry principles and framework to “traffic stops even when a minor law has been violated”).

IV; Minn. Const. art. I, § 10; Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484, 83 S. Ct. 407, 416 (1963)

“[E]ach incremental intrusion during a stop must be strictly tied to and justified by the circumstances which rendered the initiation of the stop permissible.” (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19, 88 S. Ct. at 1878) (quotation marks omitted).

“When reviewing a pretrial order on a motion to suppress evidence, [appellate courts] may independently review the facts and determine whether, as a matter of law, the 6 district court erred in suppressing or not suppressing the evidence.” State v. Askerooth

A police officer may temporarily detain a suspect without probable cause if (1) “the stop was justified at its inception” by reasonable articulable suspicion of wrongdoing and (2) “the actions of the police during the stop were r easonably related to and justif ied by the circumstances that gave rise to the stop in the first place.” (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-21, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1878- 1880 (1968)).

d 353, 370 (Minn. 2004) (stating that evidence abandoned in response to an illegal seizure must be suppressed).

407 , 416, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963) ; State v. Askerooth , , 370 (Minn. 2004).

In Minnesota, this right “requires application of Terry[1] principles to traffic stops.” State v. Askerooth

’” (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19, 88 S. Ct. at 1878) ( other quotation omitted ).

Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812–13, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 1774 (1996); –75 (Minn. 2004) (Anderson, J., concurring specially) .

[and] whether the actions of the police during the stop were reasonably related to and justified by the circumstances that gave rise to the stop in the first place.” (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20, 88 S. Ct. at 1879).

“An initially valid stop may become invalid if it becomes intolerable in its intensity or scope.” State v. Askerooth , (quotation omitted).

But “each incremental intrusion during a traffic stop [must] be tied to and justified by one of the following: (1) the original legitimate purpose of the stop, (2) independent probable cause, or (3) reasonableness, as defined in Terry [v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1968 (1968)].”

A traffic stop initially supported by reasonable suspicion may be expanded, so long as the expansion is “strictly tied to and ju stified by the circumstances which rendered the initiation of the stop permissible.” (quotations omitted).

“[E]ach incremental intrusion during a stop must be strictly tied to and justified by the c ircumstances which rendered the initiation of the stop permissible.” (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 19, 88 S. Ct. at 1868) (quotation marks omitted).

“When reviewing a pretrial order on a motion to suppress evidence, [appellate courts] may independently review the facts and determine whether, as a matter of law, the district court erred in suppressing or not suppressing the evidence.”

This objective test requires consideration of whether “‘the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure [would] warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate.’” (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22, 88 S. Ct. 1880).

D E C I S I O N “When reviewing a pretrial order on a motion to suppress evidence, we may independently review the facts and determine whether, as a matter of law, the district court erred in suppressing or not suppressing the evidence.” State v. Askerooth , d 353, 359 (Minn. 2004).