Cited by

(“Deference must be given to the opportunity of the trial court to assess the credibility of the witnesses.”).

3 Father also argues that, even if the locale-restriction clause does not constitute an agreement to apply the best -interests standard, “enforcing negotiated settlement agreements is a positive public policy.” We decline to address father’s public-policy argument because “[t]he function of the court of appeals is limited to identifying errors and then correcting them.” Sefkow v. Sefkow , (“Because this court is limited in its function to correcting errors it cannot create public policy.”), rev.

(stating that appellate courts defer to district court credibility determinations).

(noting that appellate courts defer to a district court’s credibility determinations).

(“Deference must be given to the opportunity of the [district] court to assess the credibility of the 10 witnesses.”); see also Minn. R. Civ.

(“Deference must be given to the opportunity of the [district] court to assess the credibility of the witnesses.”); see also Minn. R. Civ.

We defer to the district court’s credibility determinations, and based on this record, we are not left with a “definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made,” Fletcher, d at 101.

(noting that appellate courts defer to district court credibility determinations).

See Albright, d at 111 (quoting syllabus as authority); (citing syllabus of a prior opinion as authority).

(addressing the setting of support in manner that 6 is against logic and facts on the record); Sefkow v. Sefkow , (addressing an improper application of law).

d 468, 477 (Minn. App. 2000) (noting that the law “leaves scant if any room for an appellate court to question the [district] court’s balancing of best-interests considerations”).

at 222 (quotations and citation omitted); (explaining that the district court’s “findings must be sustained unless clearly erroneous” and that “[d]eference must be given to the opportunity of the [district] court to assess the credibility of the witnesses” (quotation omitted)).

(“The function of the court of appeals is limited to identifying errors and then correcting them.”); rev. denied (Minn. May 16, 2000); -40 (Minn. App. 2005) (“Although these

See, (stating that “[s]plit physical custody exists when each parent has sole physical custody of some, but not all, of the parents’ children” ()).

d 203, 210 (Minn. 1988).

(noting that in the context of child-custody matters, the law “leaves scant if any room for an appellate court to question the [district] court’s balancing of best-interests considerations”).

(“The function of the court of appeals is limited to identifying errors and then correcting them.”); (“Because this court is limited in its function to correcting errors it cannot create public policy.”), rev. denied (Minn. May 16, 2000)

(holding that “[a] custodial parent’s move out of state is clearly a change in circumstances” under the custody- modification statute).

Sefkow v. Sefkow , 2 Section 518.05 also precluded the district court from annulling the marriage after Irvin’s passing even though the HRO prohibited respondent from having any contact with Irvin at the time of the marriage.

We also note that our function “is limited to identifying errors and then correcting them.”

We are an error-correcting court, and our function “is limited to identifying errors and then correcting them.” (citations omitted).

d 203, 210 (Minn. 1988).

aselaw, we conclude that it is unclear whether the Minnesota Supreme Court has adopted cross-jurisdictional class-action tolling, and because we are not a policy-making court, LaChappelle v. Mitten , rev. denied (Minn. May 16, 2000), and “[t]he function of the court of appeals is limited to identifying errors and then correcting them,” rather than creating new law, we decline the invitation to adopt cross-jurisdictional class-action tolling in this appeal.