Cited by

-12 (Minn. 1988) (reversing this court’s ruling that district court could not consider post-separation evidence in determining custody, stating that “events of the past four and one- half years” of litigation were “not only relevant” but were “crucial in determining the child’s best interests”); Mize v. Kendall

We will sustain factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous, and defer to the district court’s assessment of witness credibility

(stating that “[d]eference must be given to the opportunity of the trial court to assess the credibility of the witnesses”); (stating that “[c]onflicts in the evidence, even though the presentation is upon affidavits, are to be resolved b

The role of this court is to identify and correct errors and “describe[] what we believe to be the current state of the law.” (), aff’d

And “[t]he function of the court of appeals is limited to identifying errors and then correcting them.”

d 203, 210 (Minn. 1988).

Though Egan makes arguably reasonable policy assertions about the discretionary authority of a district court pursuant to the statutorily created HRO special proceeding, we are “limited to identifying errors and then correcting them.” d 203, 210 (Minn. 1988) (citations omitted); (Minn. 2 Egan also directs us to Baker v. Baker, to argue that the district court has broad powers to order injunctive relief.

(stating that an appellate court does not find facts).

(“We have criticized before the court of appeals’ misapplication of the scope of review when it has usurped the role of the trial court by reweighing the evidence and finding its own facts .

(noting that district court’s findings “implicitly indicate[d]” that it found certain evidence credible).

“The function of the court of appeals is limited to identifying errors and then correcting them.” d 203, 210 (Minn. 1988); (quoting this aspect of Sefkow).

See Sefkow v. Sefkow , 12 (reiterating that appellate courts reviewing district court’s findings for clear error may not reweigh evidence or retry i ssue but only determine whether record supports findings).

We will sustain factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous, and we defer to the district court’s opportunity to assess witness credibility

See Skarhus v. Davanni’s Inc., (holding that this court defers to the ULJ’s credibility determinations on appella te review); (holding that appellate courts do not reweigh evidence on appeal).

“Deference must be given to the opportunity of the [fact-finder] to assess the credibility of the witnesses.”

Regardless, our standard of review is limited to determining whether the district court’s findings were “clearly erroneous,” McCulloch, d at 566 (quotation omitted), and we defer to the district court’s findings of credibility

Ap pellate courts are error-correcting courts, and, while the district court’s failure to adopt a paragraph related to the parties’ mutual requirement is a mistake, husband fails to demonstrate in his brief how this mistake prejudices him, see Minn. R. Civ.

See Sefkow v. Sefkow , (“The function of the court of appeals is limited to ide ntifying errors and then correcting them.”); (“[T]he task of extending existing law falls to the supreme court or the legislature, but it does not fall to this court.”), rev. denied

We defer to the district court’s credibility determinations, Sefkow v. Sefkow , and thus review husband’s arguments regarding each prope rty to determine whether the court’s corroboration assessments are supported by the record.

5 (Minn. App. 2009) (noting that district court’s findings “implicitly indicate[d]” that it found certain evidence credible); Knapp v. Knapp , (stating that “[appellate courts] defer to the district court’s credibili

(credibility determinations); (implicit credibility determinations).

Sefkow v. Sefkow , 9 (Minn. 1988).

d 370, 374-75 (Minn. 1990) (recognizing that role of appellate courts is to correct errors, not to find facts); (“The function of the court of appeals is limited to identifying errors and then correcting them.”).

(holding that appellate courts do not reweigh evidence on appeal); Skarhus v. Davanni’s Inc., (holding that we defer to the ULJ’s credibilit y determinations on appellate review).

Because we defer to the district court on matters of witness credibility and the weight given to evidence, d 203, 210 (Minn. 1988), this argument fails.

Because we do not reweigh the statutory factors, (sta ting the appellate courts do not reweigh the evidence), we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by finding that change in this factor alone does not warrant reallocating daughter’s tax exemption.