Cited by

“The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution guarantees the right of an accused in a criminal prosecution to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” (quotations omitted).

One purpose of the confrontation clause is to permit defendants to “reveal a prototypical form of bias on the part of the witness.”

see also Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-17 (1974) (describing cross-examination’s important role in testing the credibility of a witness).

We have observed that “not everything tends to show bias, and courts may exclude evidence that is only marginally useful for this purpose.”

609(a)(2), and they were offered to impeach a prosecution witness, not a testifying defendant, (evaluating the admissibility of prior felony convictions to impeach a prosecution witness by considering concerns such as protecting witnesses from harassment, not confusing the jury, and not unreasonably prolonging trials).

Although the Confrontation Clause protects the rights of defendants to reveal a witness’s bias through cross-examination, “not everything tends to show bias, and courts may exclude evidence that is only marginally useful for this purpose.” see also Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986) (noting that district courts have “wide latitude” to reasonably limit cross- examination “based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness’ safet

“Bias is a catchall term describing attitudes, feelings, or emotions of a witness that might affect [his] testimony, leading [him] t o be more or less favorable to the position of a party for reasons other than the merits.” d 635, 640 (Minn. 1995).

We recognize however that “not everything tends to show bias,” including evidence that is “so attenuated as to be unconvincing.”

Evidence of a witness’s bias is generally “relevant as discrediting the witness and affecting the weight of his testimony.” (quotations omitted) .

.” (affirming district court’s decision to limit cross-examination and exclude extrinsic evidence).

In terms of witness bias, “the C onfrontation Clause contemplates a cross-examination of the witne ss in which the defendant has the opportunity to reveal a prototypical form of bias on the part of the witness.”

Generally, a witness’s bias —whether demonstrated through confrontation or by extrinsic evidence—is “relevant as discrediting the witness and affecting the weight of his testimony.” 0 (Minn. 1995) (quoting Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 , 94 S. Ct. 1105, 1110 (1974)); see also, Minn. R. Evid.

As explaine d by the supreme court in 9 State v. Lanz-Terry: “When evaluating whether to admit a prior conviction of the defendant or a defense witness, the major concern is to protect the defendant from unfair prejudice.”

(quotations and citations omitted).

“In criminal cases, the Confrontation Clause contemplates a cross-examination of the wi tness in which the defendant has the opportunity to reveal a prototypical form of bias on the part of the witness.” see also Minn. R. Evid.

(noting that events that 9 took place after the victim reported the incident “would not have affected” the victim’s decision to report).

The district court has the discretion to limit cross -examination to avoid “harassment, decision making on an improper basis, confusion of the issues, and cross -examination that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.”

misconduct may be admitted to show that a witness is motivated by bias.” State v. Lanz-Terry

616; (noting that bias of 2 Despite this ruling by the dist rict court, Plantenberg did not ask either H.P.

See State v. Lanz-Terry , -40 (Minn. 1995) (describing these concerns).

“[W]hen evaluating whether to admit a prior conviction of a prosecution witness, the major concerns are to protect the witness from being harassed and unduly embarrassed, the jury from being confused and misled, and everyone involved (court, jury, parties) from having to endure an unnecessarily prolonged trial.”

7 prototypical form of bias on the part of the witness.” see also Minn. R. Evid.

“Bias is a catchall term describing attitudes, feelings, or emotions of a witness that might affect her testimony, leading her to be more or less favorable to the position of a party for reasons other than the merits.” (quotation omitted).

by saying he had been convicted of a felony “on at least one prior occasion.” A similar argument was raised in State v. Lanz-Terry, where the Minnesota Supreme Court addressed “whether the trial court violated Lanz-Terry’s right to confront witnesses under the Sixth Amendment by precluding him from questioning [a witness] about [the witness’s] five prior felony convictions.”

The district court has “broad discretion” to control the scope of cross-examination and may “impose reasonable limits on cross-examination of a prosecution witness.”

d 635, 641 (Minn. 1995).

or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.” Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679, 106 S. Ct. 1431, 1435 (1986); (stating that it is within “the discretionary authority of the judge to control the scope of cross-examination .

“Whether the [district] court abused its discretion in restricting a defendant’s attempted cross-examination that is aimed at showing bias turns on whether the jury has sufficient other information to make a discriminating appraisal of the witness’s bias or motive to fabricate.” State v. Lanz–Terry, (quotation omitted).