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(“[I]ntent to cause death may be inferred from the manner of shooting.” (quotation omitted)); - 32 (Minn. 1989) (concluding that “a contact gunshot from a .22 revolver to the back of a person’s head” supported a finding of intent because it would be

When considering all the circumstances, a “jury may infer that a person intends the natural and probable consequences of his actions and a defendant’s statements as to his intentions are not binding on the jury if his acts demonstrated a contrary intent.”

(concluding fatal cuts that severed victim’s vein and artery, in addition to multiple stab wounds, showed intent to cause death); (concluding state provided sufficient evidence of defendant’s intent to kill when he stabbed victim with long blade in chest), (concluding state proved intent when Cooper shot at victim twelve times as he was crawling away).

(The jury may consider both the conduct of the offender and the reaction of the victim.

“In reaching its conclusion, the jury may infer that a person intends the natural and probable consequences of his actions and a defendant’s statements as to his intentions are not binding on the jury if his acts demonstrated a contrary intent.” 181 (Minn. 1997) (affirming appellant’s conviction for first-degree murder and rejecting argument that circumstantial evidence did not prove 13 premeditation or intent).

erence of premeditation,” “[a] single shot squarely in the back can support a finding of premeditation because it indicates that the shooter took careful aim at the victim,” “[m]ultiple gunshots are indicative of premeditation,” State v. Cooper, 19 and “[t]he failure to administer any aid to a victim who does not die instantaneously also supports an inference of premeditation,” Cox, d at 414.

In a context other than test refusal, the supreme court has noted that direct evidence of intent is rarely available, and therefore, intent generally must be proved “by drawing inferences from the defendant’s words and actions in light of the totality of the circumstances.”

A defendant’s intent is a state of mind, which is generally proven circumstantially “by drawing inferences from the defendant’s words and actions in light of the totality of the circumstances.”

“To prove intent, it is permissible for the jury to ‘infer that a person intends the natural and probable consequences of his actions.’ ” 22 (d 175, 179 (Minn. 1997)).

“Intent is an inference drawn by the jury from the totality of circumstances,” and the 12 fact-finder may infer that a person intends the natural and probable consequences of that person’s actions

(noting the fact that the defendant “fired at [the victim] at least twelve separate times and was then only concerned with fleeing the scene as quickly as possible” as support for the conclusion that “the only rational hypothesis to be drawn from the evidence was that the killing was premeditated”

Because intent is a state of mind, it is “generally proved circumstantially —by drawing inferences from the defendant’s words and actions in light of the totality of the circumstances.”

A defendant’s intent can be ascertained “by drawing inferences from the defendant’s words and actions in light of the totality of the circumstances.”

A fact-finder may infer that an actor “intends the natural and probable consequences of his actions.”

Because intent is a state of mind, it is usually proved “circumstantially—by drawing inferences from the defendant ’s words and actions in light of the totality of the 9 circumstances.”

“Generally, intent is proven circumstantially by drawing inferences from the defendant’s words and actions in light of the totality of the circumstances.”

To prove intent, it is permissible for the jury to “infer that a person intends the natural and probable consequences of his actions.” State v. Cooper , .

The state generally proves intent “from the 7 defendant’s words and actions in light of the totality of the circumstances.”

Specifically, the court observed that the “natural and probable consequence of firing six shots into a person’s torso is that the person will die.” (holding that a factfinder may infer that a person intends “the natural and probable consequences” of the person’s actions even when contrary to the person’s stated intent).

The state generally proves intent circumstantially “ from the defendant’s words and actions in light of the totality of the circumstances.”

See, e.g., McAllister, d at 53

Because intent is a state of mind , it is “ge nerally proved circumstantially —by drawing inferences from the defendant’ s words and actions in light of the totality of the circumstances.”

Intent is generally proved with circumst antial evidence, “by drawing inferences from the defendant’s words and actions in light of the totality of the circumstances.”