Cited by

Chavez-Nelson, d at 671, 673 (); see also Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd.

2 (holding that when a direct appeal has been taken “all claims known but not raised[] will not be considered upon a subsequent petition for postconviction relief.”).

“[W]here direct appeal has once been taken, all matters raised therein, and all claims known but not raised, will not be considered upon a subsequent petition for postconviction relief.” see also Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd.

See, (holding “that where direct appeal has once been taken, all matters raised therein, and all claims known but not raised, will not be considered upon a subsequent petition for postconviction relief”).

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION CONNOLLY, Judge Appellant challenges the denial of his petition for postconviction relief without an evidentiary hearing, arguing that the district court abused its discretion in concluding that appellant’s claims were barred by both State v. Knaffla , 2 (holding that, “where direct appeal has once been taken, all matters raised therein, and all claims known but not raised, will not be considered upon a subsequent petition for postconviction relief”) and the law-of-the-ca

As explained below, we discern no abuse 3 See State v. Knaffla , (precluding review of postconviction claims that were known but not raised on direct appeal).

2 The postconviction court denied the petition on two grounds: (1) Wiseman’s and (2) Wiseman’s claims failed on the merits.

It also found that Glover’s because the claims arose at trial and Glover failed to raise them in his direct appeal.

And, while the postconviction court did not reach this issue, we further determine that Treptow’s

613(a) (allowing a party to examine a witness “concerning a prior statement made by the witness”); (“It is well established that proper impeachment evidence includes prior inconsistent statements.”).

We agree with appellant as to her false-medical-evidence claim because, under the unique circumstances of this case, the record reflects that the interests-of-justice exception 1 See State v. Knaffla , (precluding review of postconviction claims that were known but not raised on direct appeal).

“[W]here direct appeal has once been taken, all matters raised therein, and all claims known but not raised, will not be considered upon a subsequent petition for postconviction relief.” see also Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd.

A second procedural bar also applies after a litigant makes a direct appeal, prohibiting the litigant from raising (1) issues already raised in a direct appeal, (2) any “claims known but not raised,” or (3) any claims that “should have been known but were not raised in the direct appeal.” State v. Knaffla

(precluding review of claims that were known but not raised on direct appeal).

“A postconviction court abuses its discretion when its decision is based 2 (holding “that where direct appeal has once been taken, all matters raised therein, and all claims known but not raised, will not be considered upon a subsequent petition for postconviction relief”).

4, for the proposition that the statutory time bar is jurisdictional.

A. Knaffla-Barred Claims Following an appellant’s direct appeal, “all matters raised therein, and all claims known but not raised, will not be considered upon a subsequent petition for postconviction relief.”

The state argued that Rock’s argued in the alternative that his claim of insufficient evidence fails on the merits, and argued that he is not entitled to forensic DNA testing.

In its response, the State argued that Waiters’s petition is time-barred under section 590.01, subdivision 4, and procedurally barred under both section 590.01, subdivision 1, 2 3 The State also asserted that Waiters’s petition should be summarily denied under Minnesota Statutes section 590.04, subdivision 3 (2024), because the petition raises issues that have previously been decided in appellate proceedings.

4(a), and procedurally barred under Knaffla, (stating that all claims that were or could have been raided on direct appeal will not be considered in a subsequent petition for postconviction relief).

The district court denied postconviction relief, concluding that Johnson’s

3 and that Sanders failed to show that he met an exception to that rule.

In a memorandum of law supporting his petition, Silva detailed the errors that he alleged his trial counsel made, including failing “to advocate, investigate, [and] subpoena evidence,” to “properly file, or file discovery,” and “to object or challenge the dangerous offender imposition.” 6 The district court also determined that Silva’s reasoning that, at the time of his direct appeal, Silva “either knew or should have known of any issues he had with the date of his terroristic threats conviction

A if the petitioner establishes that a new interpretation of state law is retroactively applicable to the petitioner’s case in the first postconviction petition filed after the new interpretation of state law is announced.

He argues that the district court (1) erred in construing his motion as a and (2) abused its discretion in determining that his sentence was authorized by law.

Generally, “where direct appeal has once been taken, all matters raised therein, and all claims known but not raised, will not be considered upon a subsequent petition for postconviction relief.” .

(holding that “claims known but not raised” on direct appeal “will not be considered upon a subsequent petition for postconviction relief”).

ineffective-assistance- of-counsel claims that can be determined on the basis of the trial record “ will not be considered upon a subsequent petition for postconviction relief.” But when the evaluation of an ineffective -assistance-of-counsel claim “requires additional factfinding,” such as whe

It is well settled that, after a direct appeal has been taken, “all matters raised therein, and all claims known but not raised, will not be considered upon a subsequent petition for 6 postconviction relief.”

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION WHEELOCK, Judge In this appeal from the district court’s denial of her petition for postconviction relief, appellant contends that her arguments are not Knaffla 1 barred, she received ineffective 1

counsel can be determined on the basis of the trial record, the claim must be brought on direct appeal or it is Knaffla-barred.” Id.4 However, the claim is better brought in a postconviction proceeding when the claim 4 Under State v. Knaffla, all claims that are known but not raised when a direct appeal is taken “will not be considered upon a subsequent petition for postconviction relief.”