Cited by

Minnesota Constitution provides greater protection against suspicionless law enforcement conduct than the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.”); (holding police cannot expand scope of stop to investigate pretrial release condition violation without reasonable, articulable suspicion under Minnesota Constitution); -82 (Minn. 2007) (holding that a dog sniff in a hallway outside an apartment constitutes a search requiring at least a reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activi

The officer must provide “something more than an unarticulated hunch” and “must be able to point to something that objectively supports the suspicion at issue.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

“Reasonable suspicion must be based on ‘specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.’” (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)).

“Reasonable suspicion must be based on ‘specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.’” (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)).

Although the reasonable-suspicion standard is “less demanding than probable cause or a preponderance of the evidence,” it still “requires at least a minimal level of objective justification.” (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000)); (explaining that reasonable suspicion must be “something more than an unarticulated hunch” (quotations omitted)).

“Reasonable suspicion must be based on ‘specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.’” (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)).

(d 173, 180-82 (Minn. 2007)).

Cf. State v. Davis , -83 (Minn. 2007) (presuming reliability where informant reported where they worked); Balenger, d at 138 (holding that anonymous face- to-face tip was presumptively reliable).

Tips from private -citizen informants are presumed 6 reliable, particularly “when informants give information about their identity so that the police can locate them if necessary.” -83 (Minn. 2007).

“Reasonable suspicion must be based on specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” d 173, 182 (Minn. 2007) (quotation omitted).

Thus, “reasonable suspicion requires something more than an unarticulated hunch ” and “the officer must be able to point to something that objectively supports the suspicion at issue.” d 173, 182 (Minn. 2007) (quotations omitted).

(explaining that “what constitutes an unreasonable search must be assessed based on the facts of each particular case”).

(explaining that “what constitutes an unreasonable search must be assessed based on the facts of each particular case”).

But a stop is not valid if it is based on “mere whim, caprice or idle curiosity.” (quotation omitted); (“[R]easonable suspicion requires something more than an unarticulated hunch .

4 Reasonable suspicion must be based on “specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” (quotation omitted).

Courts examine the specific police conduct at issue, assessing the reasonableness of tha t conduct “based on the facts of each particular case.” .

(explaining that “what constitutes an unreasonable search must be assessed based on the facts of each particular case”).

d 173, 182 (Minn. 2007).

(explaining that “what constitutes an unreasonable search must be assessed based on the facts of each particular case”).

An office r’s reasonable suspicion must be based on “specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably 13 warrant that intrusion.” (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21).

“We presume that tips from private citizen informants are reliable,” especially “when informants give information about their identity so th at the police can locate them if necessary.” -83 (Min n. 2007) (citations omitted).

The standard for reasonable suspicion is not high, 4 and will be met with “specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably” justify the officer’s conduct, (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880 (1968)).

It is met with “specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant [the officer’s] intrusion.” (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880 (1968)).

Reasonable suspicion requires “something more than an unarticulated hunch”; “the officer must be able to point to something that objectively supports the suspicion at issue.” (quotation omitted); see also Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22, 88 S. Ct. at 1880.

The reasonable-suspicion threshold is not high, but it does require the officer to have more 5 than a “hunch,” and the ability to identify “something that objectively supports the suspicion.” (quotation omitted).