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Because he did not file any posttrial motions asserting this argument, we may review the substantive legal questions raised during trial and consider “whether the evidence sustains the [district] court’s findings of fact and whether such findings sustain the conclusions of law and the judgment.”

“Our limited scope of review does not allow us to engage in additional fact-finding or to remand for different factual findings supporting different conclusions.” -34 (Minn. App. 2009).

We review a district court’s CHIPS 6 determination using “a very deferential standard of review” and will not reverse absent “a clear abuse of discretion.” (quotation omitted).

P. 49.03; 732 (Minn. App. 2009).

(concluding that, even when no motion for new trial has been made, questions for review include “whether the evidence sustains the findings of fact and whether such findings sustain the conclusions of law and the judgment” (quotation omitted)).

“An appellate court exceeds its proper scope of review when it bases its conclusions on its own interpretation of the evidence and, in effect tries the issues anew and substitutes its own findings for those of the trial judge.” (quotation omitted).

A district court is entrusted with broad discretion in such cases, In re Welfare of Child of 13 S.S.W., including the discretion to add a person as a party if the court deems them “to be important to a resolution that is in the best interests of the child,” Minn. R. Juv.

ent for [the child].” And the district court stated that it did “not believe [m]other would successfully be able to safety plan for [the child] given her denial of the abuse.” It is well settled that, when reviewing TPR decisions, “[c]onsiderable deference” is afforded the district court because it is in a “superior position to assess the credibility of witnesses.” 12 (quotation omitted).

properly raised during trial.” (quotation omitted).

properly raised during trial.” (quotation omitted); (concluding that father’s constitutional challenge to the district court’s order 24 terminating his parental rights was outside the scope of appellate review bec

properly raised during trial.” (quotation omitted).

We give “[c]onsiderable deference” to the district court’s decision due to its “superior position to assess the credibility of witnesses.” (quotation omitted).

When reviewing termination decisions, appellate courts give “[c]onsidera ble deference” to the district court due to its “superior position to assess the credibility of witnesses.” (quotation omitted); see also Sefkow v. Sefkow

We review a district court’s CHIPS determination using “a very deferential standard of review” and will not reverse absent “a clear abuse of discretion.” (quotation omitted).

The district court is in a “superior position to assess the credibility of witnesses.” (quotation omitted).

In conducting our review, we give “[c]onsiderable deference” to the district court’s decisions due to its “superior position to assess the credibility of witnesses.” (quotation omitted).

5 We review a district court’s CHIPS determination using “a very deferential standard of review.”

We look closely at the “sufficiency of the evidence to determine whether the evidence is clear an d convincing” and give “[c]onsiderable deference” to the district court’s decision to terminate parental rights due to the district court’s “superior position to assess the credibility of witnesses.” (quotation omitted).

Appellate courts look at the “sufficiency of the evidence to determine whether it was clear and convincing” and give “[c]onsiderable deference” to the district court’s 8 decision due to that court’s “superior position to assess the credibility of witnesses.” (quotation omitted).

d 723, 735 (Minn. App. 2009) (deferring to a district court’s implicit credibility determination in a child-in-need-of-protection-or-services proceeding).

in favor of a grant to the Commissioner of Human Services.” Grandmother argues th at “terminating custodial rights is not a concept recognized under Minnesota law.” “If a statute’s language is clear and unambi guous, a reviewing court must give effect to its plain meaning.”

[may] outweigh the need for [siblings] to reside together.”); Doren v. Doren , 431 N.W .2d 558, 561 (Minn. App. 1988) (“[W hen] other factors outweigh the need for siblings to reside together, split custody may be appropriate.”); (citing to juvenile-protection and custody statutes and stating that in determining a child’s best interests, “the district court traditionally considers the child’s unique circumstances and individual needs” (emphasis added)).

See In re Welfare of Child of 11 S.S.W., (“[T]he district court traditionally considers the child’s unique circumstances and individual needs.” (emphasis added)).

For this contention, he cites this court’s opinion in in which we affirmed the dismissal of a CHIPS petition on the ground that a mother’s history of child-abuse and mental-health issues were insufficient bases for declaring her child in need of protection or services.

The natural rights of the parents should be carefully safeguarded but not at the expense of their children.” (); (citing this aspect of Booth in a child-in-need-of-protection-or- services appeal); In re P.T.

731 (Minn. App. 2009) (stating that determining a child's best interests involves consideration of "the child's unique circumstances and individual needs," citing multiple statutory standards on best interests).

(stating that determining a child’s best intere sts involves consideration of “the child’s unique circumstances and individual needs,” citing multiple statutory standards on best interests).

And our review of a CHIPS adjudication is “very deferential,” requiring affirmance absent a “clear abuse of discretion.” (quotation omitted).

28 (Minn. App. 2009); see Minn. Stat. § 260C.007, subd.

Where credibility determinations are required, “[i]n the absence of a clear abuse of discretion[,] the action of the trial court must be affirmed.” (quotation omitted).