Cited by

Abuse of discretion is the proper standard because “the district court is in the best position to evaluate the prejudicial impact, if any, of an event occurring during the trial.”

(stating appellate courts review the denial of a mistrial motion for abuse of discretion because “the district court is in the best position to evaluate the prejudicial impact, if any, of an event occurring during the trial”).

We “assume that the jury disbelieved any evidence that conflicts with the verdict.”

First, a jury may find a defendant guilty of one charge and not guilty of another charge, even if those verdicts are “logically inconsistent.” aff’d, (stating that reversal is not available “in cases of alleged conflict between guilty and not-guilty verdicts”).

In that type of review, w e apply a deferential standard of review because “the district court is in the best position to evaluate the prejudicial impact, if any, of an event occurring during the trial.”

See State v. 10 Bahtuoh, (concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the appellant’s mistrial motion, in part because the disputed reference “was uttered only once during the course of a 4-day trial”).

5 the scene of the crime with the principal offender.” State v. Bahtuoh

(“A jury may infer the requisite state of mind from a variety of facts, including presence at the scene of the crime, a close association with the principal offender before and after the crime, a lack of objection or surprise under the circumstances, and flight from the scene of the crime with th

“The [s]tate ordinarily proves a criminal defendant’s mental state by circumstantial evidence.”

“We review the denial of a motion for a mistrial for an abuse of discretion because the district court is in the best position to evaluate the prejudicial impact, if any, of an event occurring during the trial.”

“We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and assume that the jury disbelieved any evidence that conflicts with the verdict.” d 804, 809 (Minn. 2013).

Appellate courts “reverse[] convictions based upon legal inconsistency only in cases involving multiple guilty verdicts that are inconsistent with one another, not in cases of alleged conflict between guilty and not -guilty verdicts.”

(“The State ordinarily proves a criminal defendant’s mental state by circumstantial evidence.”).

“[W]e view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and assume that the jury disbelieved any evidence that conflicts with the verdict.”

The necessary state of mind for accomplice liability may be inferred from “presence at the scene of the crime, a close association with the principal offender before and after the crime, a lack of objection or surprise under the circumstances, and flight from the scene of the crime with the principal offender.”

State v. Bahtuoh , (quotation omitted).

A “district court is in the best position to evaluate the prejudicial impact, if any, of an event occurring during the trial.”

A “district court is in the best position to evaluate the prejudicial impact, if any, of an event occurring during the trial.” State v. Bahtuoh

10 hypothesis other than guilt.”

A “district court is in the best position to evaluate the pr ejudicial impact, if any, of an event occurring during the trial.”

Second, we determine “whether the circumstances proved are consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any rational hypothe sis other than guilt.” State v. Bahtuoh

To “intentionally aid” means “that the defendant knew that his alleged accomplices were going to commit a crime” and “that the defendant intended his presence or actions to 7 further the commission of that crime.” State v. Bahtuoh , (Minn .

As a general rule, “[n]othing in the constitution requires consistent verdicts.” d 804, 820 (Minn. 2013) (quotation omitted).

1 “On appeal, the defendant has the burden to prove that his or her waiver was invalid .” State v. Bahtuoh

Second, the appellate court determines “whether the circumstances proved are consistent with guilt and inc onsistent with any rational hy pothesis other than guilt.”

In State v. Bahtuoh, the appellant also argued that his “trial counsel was ineffective when he told the jury during his opening statement that Bahtuoh would testify and then 7 later advised Bahtuoh not to testify.”

The phrase “intentionally aids” requires two components: “(1) that the defendant knew that his alleged accomplices were going to commit a crime, and (2) that the defendant intended his presence or actions to further the 7 commission of that crime.” (quotations omitted).

Second, the appellate court determines “whether the circum stances proved are consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis other than guilt.” State v. Bahtuoh

Second, the court determines “whether the circumstances proved ar e consistent with guilt and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis other than guilt.” State v. Bahtuoh

“[T]rial tactics should not be reviewed by an appellate court, which unlike the counsel, has the benefit of hindsight.” (quotation omitted); d 804, 817 (Minn. 2013) (stating that the supreme court has “cautioned against relying on hindsight when reviewing decisions made by trial counsel”).

Second, the court determines “whether th e circumstances proved are cons istent with guilt and inconsistent with any rational hypothesis other than guilt.” d 804, 810 (Minn. 2013).

“A jury may infer the requisite state of mind from a variety of facts, including presence at the scene of the crime, [and] a close association with the principal offender before and after the crime.” State v. Bahtuoh

State v. Bahtuoh , , 819 (Minn. 2013) (stating that denial of a *472 motion for a mistrial is reviewed for an abuse of discretion because "the district court is in the best position to evaluate the prejudicial impact, if any, of an event occurring during the trial."); see State v. Vasquez , , 648 (Minn. 2018) (reviewing t

.W.2d at 591–92 (concluding that postconviction court did not err in denying ineffective- assistance-of-counsel claim based on failure to object because it “is well established that we give an attorney’s trial -strategy decision particular deference,” and that “decisions about objections at trial are matters of trial strategy, which we will not review” (quotations omitted)); n.3 (Minn. 2013) (stating that appellate courts “do not second-guess trial counsel’s decisions about trial strategy,” and