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But a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is “properly raised in a first postconviction petition, because the petitioner could not have known of such a claim at the time of direct appeal.” -71 (Minn. 2016).

(stating appellate counsel “has no duty to raise all possible issues, and may choose to present only the most meritorious claims to the court”); (“Counsel does not act unreasonably by not asserting claims that counsel could have legitimately co

(holding that a prosecutor did not commit misconduct by arguing that “it would be nice to know a motive for these brutal homicides”).

“When an ineffective assistance of 9 appellate counsel claim is based on appellate counsel’s failure to raise an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim,” as is the case here, “the petitioner must first show that trial counsel was ineffective to prevail on the appellate counsel claim.” Zornes v. State , (quotations omitted).

Additionally, an appellate counsel “has no duty to raise all possible issues, and may choose to present only the most meritorious claims to the court.” (“Counsel does not act unreasonably by not asserting claims that counsel could have legitimately concluded would not prevail.”).

A postconviction petition “must constitute more than argumentative assertions without factual support.”

Nevertheless, a petitioner’s allegations must constitute more than argumentative assertions without factual support.” d 363, 368 (Minn. 2016) (citation omitted).

Under Knaffla, Hendrickson’s ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims are “barred if they are based on the trial record and were known or should have been known to him at the time of his direct appeal.”

Under the first prong of the Strickland test, “[a]ppellate counsel has no duty to raise all possible issues, and may choose to present only the most meritorious claims to the court.”

A claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is “properly raised in a first postconviction petition, because the petitioner could not have known of such a claim at the time of direct appeal.” -71 (Minn. 2016).

Nor does appellate counsel “act unreasonably by not raising issues that he or she could have legitimately concluded would not prevail.”

Applies to both a claim for ineffective assistance of trial counsel, of appellate counsel, a petitioner must prove both prongs of the Strickland test.” -71 (Minn. 2016).

Further, “an ineffective-assistance -of-trial-counsel claim brought in a postconviction proceeding following a direct appeal is not Knaffla-barred if review of the claim requires consideration of facts outside those in the [district] court record.”

This court “presume[s] that jurors follow the court’s instructions.”

There is “a strong presumption that counsel’s performance was reasonable.”

On appeal, Gutierrez appears to assume that the jury disreg arded these instructions, but “we presume that jurors follow the court’s instructions.”

[Zornes] can’t explain that smoke detector.” Because the district court granted appellant’s motion in limine preventing the state from indirectly commenting on his right not to testify, we analyze his first argument as a claim of objected-to misconduct.

-40 (Minn. 2019) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 2068 (1984))

17 A “strong presumption” exists “that counsel’s performance was reasonable.”

(“Appellate counsel does not act unreasonably by not raising issues that he or sh e could have legitimately conc luded would not prevail.”).

Appellate counsel does not have a “duty to raise all possible issues, and may choose to present only the most meritorious claims on appeal.” (explaining also that “[a]ppellate counsel does not act unreasonably by 12 not raising issues that he or she could have legitimately concluded would not prevail”); Leake , d at 536

A claim of ineffect ive assistance of appellate counsel is “properly raised in a first postconviction petition, because the petitioner could not have known of such a claim at the time of direct appeal.” -71 (Minn. 2016).

A claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is “properly raised in a first postconviction petition, because the petitioner could not have known of such a claim at the time of direct appeal.” -71 (Minn. 2016).

See Schleicher v. State , (concluding petitioner’s ineffective-assistance-of-postconviction-counsel claim was properly raised on appeal from denial of first petition for postconviction relief); (holding that ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim must be raised on direct appeal if further development of the record is not required to consider the claim).

373 (Minn. 2016) (noting that appellate courts “presume that jurors follow the court’s instructions”).

See State v. DeRosier , –08 (Minn. 2005) (applying harmless -beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard and citing to Triplett in doing so)

An ineffective -assistance-of-appellate-counsel claim is “properly raised in a first postconviction petition, because the petitioner could not have known of such a claim at the time of direct appeal.” d 363, 370-71 (Minn. 2016) (Zornes I).

An indirect reference to a “defendant’s choice not to testify” is misconduct if it “(1) manifest[s] the 12 prosecutor’s intention to call attention to the defendant’s failure to testify, or (2) [is] such that the jury would naturally have understood [it] as a comment on the defendant’s failure to testify.”

Zornes v. State , , 371 (Minn. 2016) ("[T]o prove ineffective assistance of appellate counsel a petitioner must prove both prongs of the Strickland test.").

“We presume that jurors follow the court’s instructions.” Zornes v. State

4 Zornes v. State (Zornes II), -71 (Minn. 2016).

Zornes v. State , 73 (Minn. 2016).

There is a “strong presumption that counsel’s performance was reasonable.” Zornes v. State