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However, an attorney’s conduct in not investigating a defense may constitute unreasonable representation if the failure was due to “inattention or neglect.”

- 218 (Minn. 2016) (stating that “a failure to investigate a potential defense may constitute ineffective assistance if it results not from counsel’s considered choice but rather from inattention or neglect,” but that “[s]trategic choices made by an attorney after a thorough investigation of the facts and law

(concluding that the defendant failed to satisfy his burden of proving a reasonable probability that, had certain records been obtained, the result of the trial would have been different because such a conclusion was based on “nothing more than speculation”)

an issue so novel that its legal basis was not reasonably 5 available at the time of the direct appeal” and, second, the interests-of-justice exception that applies “as fairness requires if the claim has substantive merit and the petitioner did not deliberately and inexcusably fail to raise the issue in a previous proceeding.”

on direct appeal was not deliberate and inexcusable.”

“If a claim fails to satisfy one of the Strickland prongs, we need not consider both prongs in determining that the claim fails.”

If the petitioner does not satisfy one prong, the reviewing court “need not consider both prongs in determining that the claim fails.”

But the failure to investigate a defense may constitute unreasonable representation if the failure was due to “inattention or neglect.”

“We review ineffective assistance claims with a strong presumption that counsel’s performance was reasonable.”

“An attorney’s representation meets the objective standard of reasonableness if the attorney exercises the customary skills and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would exercise under the circumstances.”

are virtually unchallengeable.” (quotation omitted).

d 207, 217 (Minn. 2016) .

“ If a claim fails to satisfy one of the Strickland prongs, we need not consider both prongs in determining that the claim fails.”

To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant “must show that (1) counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”

“If a claim fails to satisfy one of the Strickland prongs, we need not cons ider both prongs in determining that the claim fails.” Swaney v. State , .

“[A] failure to investigate a potential defense may constitute ineffective assistance if it results not from counsel ’s considered choice but rather from inattention or neglect.” .

Strategic choices made by an 17 attorney after a thorough investigation of the facts and law are virtually unchallengeable.” (quotation and citation omitted).

“A ‘reasonable probability’ is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the case.” (quoting Strickland, 466 U. S. at 694).

There is “a strong presumption that counsel’s performance was reasonable.”

There is “a strong presumption that counsel’s performance was reasonable.”

It is true that “a failure to investigate a potential defense may c onstitute ineffective assistance if it results 4 not from counsel’s considered choice but rather from inattention or neglect.”

But Campbell’s claim that impeaching records may have existed is purely speculative.3 And “it is not proper to reverse a conviction on speculation that an investigation might have found evidence that would have helped the defendant’s case.” Swaney v. State , (d 558, 563 (Minn. 1987)).

There is “a strong presumption that counsel’s performance was reasonable.”

No netheless, “a failure to investigate a potential defense may constitute ineffec tive assistance if it results not from counsel’s considered choice but rath er from inattention or neglect.” Swaney v. State

Courts “review ineffective assistance claims with a strong presumption that counsel’ s performance was reasonable.” Swaney v. State