Cited by

see also Burrell, d at 601-02 (“The mere fact that a party declares a judge partial does not in itself generate a reasonable question as to the judge ’s impartiality.”).

(noting that whether to reserve jurisdiction over the issue of maintenance is within the district court’s discretion); (affirming the district court’s reservation of issues related to property division).

(“The record reflects that the district court carefully considered motions made by both sides; and the court ruled in favor of appellant on some very important motions.

Finally, while father alleges that the district court erred in disregarding his “reasonable arguments,” a mere adverse ruling is not proof of bias, and we presume that a district court judge “has discharged her duties properly,”

Appellate courts presume a district court discharges its duties “properly,” and we do not infer bias from adverse rulings

(“Prior adverse rulings .

(stating that “adverse rulings .

Likewise, Minnesota appellate decisions provide that a “judge should not try a case, even in the absence of bias, if circumstances have arisen which give a bona fide appearance of bias.” (“A litigant, though mistaken in fact, may conceivably assert with sincerity that he has good reason to believe, and does believe, that a judge is biased, and when he so believes his cause should be heard before another judge, if f

d 338, 341 (Minn. App. 1986).

322, 323 ( Minn. 1930) (characterizing a clerical error as an error of form that “includes one made by the court which cannot reasonably be attributed to the exercise of judicial consideration or discretion”); (construing one word as another when it reflected what the district court “clearly intended”).

(noting that adverse rulings alone are insufficient to impute bias to a judge).

But prior adverse rulings by a judge “clearly cannot constitute bias.” Olson v. Olson

We note that adverse rulings alone are insufficient to impute bias to a judge, and that the record before us reveals no evidence of judicial bias.

15, 2011); (“ [p]rior 10 adverse rulings .

But caselaw is clear that prior adverse rulings “clear ly cannot constitute bias.” Olson v. Olson

clearly cannot constitute bias.” (citing U.S. v. Anderson, 433 F.2d 856, 860 (8th Cir. 1970)).

Prior adverse rulings “clearly cannot constitute bias.” d 338, 341 (Minn. App. 1986).

See Olson v. Olson , (adverse rulings are not sufficient to demonstrate bias for the purpose of removing a judge).

See United States v. Beneke , 449 F.2d 1259 , 1261 (8th Cir. 1971) (holding insufficient to require removal "[a] mere showing of prior judicial exposure to the present parties or questions" (quotation omitted)); Olson v. Olson , , 341 (Minn. App. 1986) ("Prior adverse rulings, however, clearly cannot constitute bias ....").

See United States v. Beneke , 449 F.2d 1259, 1261 (8th Cir. 1971) (holding insufficient to require removal “[a] mere showing of prior judicial exposure to the present parties or questions” (quotation omitted)); (“ Prior adverse rul ings, however, clearly cannot constitute bias .

clearly 11 cannot constitute bias.’” ().