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The Minnesota Legislature intends a criminal statute of limitations to “protect individuals from having to defend themselves against charges when the basic facts may have become obscured by the passage of time.” (quoting Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 114 (1970)).

(“Because a subject-matter-jurisdiction claim involves a court’s power to hear a case, the claim can never be forfeited or waived.” (quotation omitted)).

A district court abuses its discretion when it “exercise[s] its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner, base[s] its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, or ma[kes] clearly erroneous factual findings.”

6 The legislature intends a criminal statute of limitations to “protect individuals from having to defend themselves against charges when the basic facts may have become obscured by the passage of time.” (quoting Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 114 (1970)).

A district court abuses its discretion when it has “exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner, based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, or made clearly erroneous factual findings.”

Stated differently, subject-matter jurisdiction refers to a court’s “statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case.” (quoting United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002)).

Statutory requirements like the 30-day time limit at issue here are “more in the nature of a statute of limitations” and “create[] a defense which might be waived by a defendant who fails to assert it.” (“[A] statute-of-limitations defense is a claim-processing rule, which is subject to waiver.”).

A district court abuses its discretion when it “exercise[s] its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner, base[s] its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, or ma[kes] clearly erroneous factual findings.” (citation omitted).

8 manner, based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, or made clearly erroneous factual findings.”

Under the first, performance prong, “an objective standard of reasonableness” is described as “representation by an attorney exercising the customary skills and diligence that a reasonably competent attorney would perform under similar circumstances.” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

See, e.g. , -36 (Minn. 2010) (holding no prejudice for ineffective assistance of counsel when there is no prejudice under plain error).

An abuse of discretion occurs if a district court “exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner, based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, or made clearly erroneous factual findings.”

tion fell below an objective standard of reasonableness regarding Plaster’s post-trial guidelines sentencing exposure, we consider whether there is a reasonable probability that, but for such assumed error by Plaster’s plea attorney, Plaster would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to tri al. See, ; rev. denied (Apr.

Subject-matter jurisdiction “can never be forfeited or waived,” (quotation omitted), and “cannot be conferred by consent,” State ex rel.

When determining whether an attorney’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, courts do not second-guess the decision of appellate counsel not to raise a claim that “appellate counsel could have legitimately concluded would not prevail.”

This “Knaffla bar” also applies to postconviction claims “that should have been known on direct appeal.” -30 (Minn. 2010); see also Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd.

We will not reverse an order denying postconviction relief “unless the postconviction court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner, based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, or made clearly erroneous factual findings.”

Appellate courts will not reverse an order denying postconviction relief “unless the postconviction court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner, based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, or made clearly erroneous factual findings.”

The district court abuses its discretion when it “exercise[s] its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner, base[s] its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, or [makes] clearly erroneous factual findings.” Reed v. State

The legislature intends a criminal statute of limitations to “protect individuals from having to defend themsel ves against charges when the basic facts may have become obscured by the passage of time.” (quoting Toussie v. United States , 397 U.S. 112, 114 (1970)).

(concluding that postconviction court did not abuse its discretion by determining claim was Knaffla barred).

We will reverse if the district court “exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner, base d its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, or made clearly erroneous factual findings.”

Reed v. State , (citing Williams v. State , (“[A]ppellate counsel is not required to raise claims on direct appeal that counsel could have legitimately concluded would not prevail.”) and Case v. State , 364 N .W.2d 797, 800 (Minn. 1985) (“[Appellate c ounsel] has no duty to includ

The district court abuses its discretion when it “exercise[s] its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner, base[s] its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, or [makes] clearly erroneous factual findings.”

And we will not reverse a postconviction court’s denial of a petition for relief unless the court “exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner, based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, or made clearly erroneous factual findings.”

The district court abuses its discretion when it “exercise[s] its discretion in an arbitrary or capr icious manner, base[s] its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, or [makes] clearly erroneous factual findings.”

An abuse of discretion occurs when the postconviction court “exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner, based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, or made clearly erroneous factual findings.”

See Reed v. State , (discussing the difference between rules governing subject- matter jurisdiction and inflexible claim -processing rules).

We will reverse the district court only when it has “exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner, based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, or made clearly erroneous factual findings.” Evans v. State , 242 (Minn. 2019) (quoting Reed v. State , d 725, 729 (Minn. 2010)).

An appellate court will not reverse a postconviction court’s order “unless the postconviction court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner, based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, or made clearly erroneous factual findings.”