Cited by

(establishing that the defendant bears the burden of showing that the error was prejudicial).

When the state presents both direct and circumstantial evidence of an element, but the direct evidence alone sufficiently supports the element, the supreme court has applied the direct-evidence standard.2 (applying direct-evidence standard because state presented sufficient direct evidence on disputed element) ( n.2 (Minn. 2010 )).

“With respect to the substantial-rights requirement, [the appellant] bears the burden of establishing that there is a reasonable likelihood that the absence of the error would have had a significant effect on the jury’s verdict.” d 24, 38 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted).

In cases involving both direct and circumstantial evidence, reviewing courts apply the traditiona l standard, rather than the circumstantial- evidence standard, when an elem ent is “sufficiently proven by direct evidence alone.”

“With respect to the substantial-rights requirement, [the defendant] bears the burden of establishing that there is a reasonable likelihood that the absence of the error would have had a significant effect on the jury’s verdict.” (quotation omitted).

(observing that the direct evidence standard of review applies when, although there is both circumstantial and direct evidence of guilt as to a particular element, the disputed element is sufficiently proved by direct evidence alone) II.

-10 (Minn. App. 2013), review denied (Minn. June 16, 2015).

“With respect to the substantial-rights requirement, [the appe llant] bears the burden of establishing that there is a reasonable likelihood that the absence of the [alle ged] error would have had a significant effect on the jury’s verdict.” (quotation omitted).

Wash bears the burden of “establishing that there is a reasonable likelihood that the absence of the error would have had a significant effect on the jury’s verdict.” (quotation omitted).

“With respect to the substantial-rights requirement, [the defendant] bears the burden of establishing that there is a reasonable likelihood that the absence of the error would have had a significant effect on the jury’s verdict.” State v. Horst , (Minn .

(“[T]he remedy for an illegal search or seizure is generally limited to the suppression of illegally obtained evidence.”).

“With respect to the substantial -rights requirement, [the appellant] bears the burden of establishing that there is a reasonable likelihood that the absence of the error would have had a signifi cant effect on the jury’s verdict.” (quotation omitted).

When a conviction is based on direct evidence alone, we undertake a “painstaking analysis of the record to determine whether the evidence, when view ed in a light most favorable to the conviction, was sufficient to permit the [fact-finder] to reach the verdict which [it] did.” (quotation omitted).

d 24, 38 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted); Little, d at 884.

It is well established that “the remedy for an illegal search or seizure is generally limited to the suppression of illegally obtained evidence.”

See, e.g., State v. Horst , (Minn. 7 In State v. Henderson, we declined to decide whether section 634.04 applies to out- of-court statements of an accomplice admitted through other witnesses at trial.

Peterson bears the burden of showing “that there is a reasonable likelihood that the absence of the error would have had a significant effect on the jury’s verdict.” 7 Peterson asks us to apply an abuse-of-discretion standard of review.

The traditional direct-evidence standard applies “when a disputed element is sufficiently proven by direct evidence alone.”

d 24, 39–40 (Minn. 2016).

To meet the substantial rights re quirement, an appellant bears the burden of showing “that there is a reasonable likelihood that the absence of the error would have had a significant effect on the jury’s verdict.” (quotation omitted).

d 24, 40 (Minn. 2016) (defining testimony as to what a witness saw as direct evidence).

-40 (Minn. 2016) (quotation o mitted).

(“[W]hen a disputed element is sufficiently proven by direct evidence alone, as it is here, it is the traditional standard, rather than the circumstantial -evidence standard, that governs.”).

An error does not require reversal if it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, which requires us to determine if “the verdict was surely unattributable to the error.”

at 167-68 (Minn. 2013) (quotations omitted); see also State v. Horst

To meet the substantial-rights requirement, an appellant be ars the burden of showing “that there is a reasonable likelihood that the ab sence of the error would have had a significant effect on the jury’s verdict.” (quotation omitted).

See State v. Horst , -40 (Minn. 2016) (statement “I want him dead” direct evidence of defendant’s intent).

When direct evidence sup ports an element of an offense, we undertake “a painstaking analysis of the record to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the conviction, was sufficient to permit the jurors to reach the verdict which they did.”

When direct evidence supports an element of an offense, this court’s review is limited “to a painstaking analysis of the record to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the conviction, was sufficient to permit the jurors to reach th e verdict which they did.” (quotation omitted).