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“If the defendant is represented, counsel plays a key role in ensuring that any plea is intelligent by explaining the charges, the rights to be waived, and the consequences of the plea.”

To be constitutionally valid, “a guilty plea must be accurate, voluntary, and intelligent.”

To be constitutionally valid, “a guilty plea must be accurate, voluntary, and intelligent.”

And when the district court questioned Ross, he agreed that he wanted to enter into the plea agreement and that he “had enough time to talk to [his] attorney about the agreement.” Furthermore, Ross’s counsel “is not required to advise the defendant of every consequence for the defendant’s plea to be intelligent.”

“Counsel, however, is not required to advise the defendant of every consequence for the defendant ’s plea to be intelligent.”

VI; Minn. Const. art. I, § 6; Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 ( 1984); Taylor v. State

“To be valid, a guilty plea must be accurate, voluntary, and intelligent.”

VI; Minn. Const. art. I, § 6; Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984)

Appellate courts review “a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel de novo.” 3 (Minn. 2016).

“A defendant has no absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea after entering it.” (quotation omitted).

“Counsel, however, is not required to advise the defendant of every consequence for the defendant’s plea to be intelligent.” Taylor v. State

“A defendant has no absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea after entering it.” (quotation omitted).

“A defendant has no absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea after ent ering it.” Taylor v. State , (quotation omitted).

To be valid, a guilty plea must be accurate, voluntary, and intelligent.” (quotation and citation omitted ).

Taylor v. State , 5 A defendant must satisfy the two-pronged Strickland test to prove a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel: (1) th at “counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,” and (2) that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors

VI; Minn. Const. art I, § 6

To be valid, a guilty plea must be accurate, voluntary, and intel ligent.” Taylor v. State , d 821, 823 (Minn. 2016) (quotation and citation omitted).

“Counsel, however, is not required to advise the defendant of every consequence for the defendant’s plea to be intelligent.”

To be valid, a guilty plea must be accurate, voluntary, and intelligent.” Taylor v. State , d 821, 823 (Minn. 2016) (quotation and citation omitted).

Ellis-Strong, d at 536; s ee also Taylor v. State , (explaining that “[a] defendant’s lack of awareness of a collateral consequence of a guilty plea does entitle a defendant to withdraw it”).

See, e.g., Campos, d at 486-87; see also Sanchez , d at 720 (n oting abrogation of Alanis); (same).

Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2063 (1984); Taylor v. State

8 “is not required to advise the defendant of every consequence for the defendant’s plea to be intelligent,” but the defendant must know of the direct consequences of a plea, which are “definite, immediate, and automatic and are punitive and a part of a defendant’s sentence.” (quotation omitted), review denied (Minn. July 18, 2017).

To be constitutionally valid, “a guilty plea must be accurate, voluntary, a nd intelligent.” Taylor v. State

A valid guilty plea must be “accurate, voluntary, and intelligent.”

To be constitutionally valid, “a guilty plea must be accurate, voluntary, and intelligent.” Taylor v. State

A valid guilty plea is “accurat e, voluntary, and intelligent.”

This standard is met if a plea is not valid; a guilty plea is valid if it is “accurate, voluntary, and intelligent.” Taylor v. State

To be constitutionally valid, “a guilty plea must be accurate, voluntary, and intelligent.”

This standard is met if the plea is not valid; a guilty plea is valid if it is “accurate, voluntary, and intelligent.” Taylor v. State

To be constitutionally valid, “a guilty plea must be accurate, voluntary, and intelligent.”

(footnot es omitted), overruled in part on other grounds by Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 374, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010)

However, “[a] defendant has no absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea after entering it.” Taylor v. State , (quotation omitted).

“A defendant has no absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea after entering it.” (quotation omitted).