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If we determine that a defendant’s plea agreement has been violated, we “may allow withdrawal of the plea, order specific performance, or alter the sentence if appropriate.”

“On demonstration that a plea agreement has been breached, the court may allow withdrawal of the plea.”

The supreme court later summarized the law by stating that, if a guilty plea “‘rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled.’” (quoting Santobello, 404 U.S. at 262).

14 designated sex offenders.” (–74 (Minn. 2000); ); see also State ex rel.

A guilty plea is not voluntary if it was based on “any improper pressures or inducements.” (quotation omitted).

“When a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled.” (quotation omitted).

673 n.3, 674-75 (Minn. 2000).

The state “cannot induce a guilty plea based on a promise by the prosecutor that goes unfulfilled or was unfulfillable from the start, such as a plea agreement involving the promise of an illegal sentence.” (“A guilty plea cannot be induced by unfulfilled or unfulfillable promises .

“On demonstration that a plea agreement has been breached, the court may allow withdrawal of the plea.”

(“On demonstration that a plea agreement has been breached, the court may allow withdrawal of the plea, order specific performance, or alter the sentence if appropriate.”).

Accordingly, if a guilty plea “‘rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled.’” (quoting Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971)).

Accordingly, if a guilty plea “‘rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled.’” (quoting Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971)).

“To determine whether a plea is voluntary, the court examines what the parties reasonably understood to be the terms of the plea agreement and all the relevant circumstances.” Raleigh, d at 96 ().

(holding that if a criminal defendant pleaded guilty based on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, and there is a subsequent breach of the plea agreement, the district court may “allow withdrawal of the plea, order specific performance, or alter the sentence if appropriate”); see also James

“A guilty plea cannot be induced by unfulfilled or unfulfillable promises, 9 including a promise of a sentence unauthorized by law.”

“What the parties agreed to involves an issue of fact to be resolved by the district court.”

State v. Brown , (reviewing a district court’s determination of the terms of a plea agreement for clear error).

“[W]hen a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled.” (alteration in original) (quotation omitted).

See, e.g. , State v. Brown , & n.6 (Minn. 2000) (holding in relevant part that defendant’s plea was not unintelligent when the district court later imposed an additional conditional-release term because defendant’s total sentence remained less than the maximum sentence contemplated in the plea agreement); Rhodes, d at 326 (“In

(“On demonstration that a plea agreement has been breached, the court may allow withdrawal of the plea, order specific performance, or alter the sentence if appropriate .”).

Nelson v. State , State v. Brown , 10 (“A guilty plea cannot be induced by unfulfilled or unfulfillable promises .

In a negotiated plea agreement, “[w]hat the parties agreed to involves an issue of fact to be resolved by the district court.” State v. Brown

See, (holding the plea clearly set conditions and consequences of defendant failing to be accepted into treatment or fail ing to complete 9 treatment: “[Appellant] understood both when he entered his plea of guilty and at sentencing that he risked an executed double durational departure sentence .

If this court finds that appellant’s plea agreement has been breached we may “order specific performance, or alter the sentence if appropriate.”

“The voluntariness requirement insures that a guilty plea is not entered be cause of any improper pressures or inducements.” State v. Brown , (quotation omitted).

(recognizing that a defendant’s plea is involuntary when the state breaks a promise that led the defendant to plead guilty).

In explaining the validity requirement, the supreme court has stated that “[t]he purpose of the voluntariness requirement is to insure that the defendant is not pleading guilty because of improper pressures.” State v. Trott

750, 90 S. Ct. 1463, 1470 (1970) (“[A]gents of the State may not produce a plea by actual or threatened physical harm or by mental co ercion overbearing the will of the defendant.”); (noting the fact that a defendant denied that he had been “subjected to threats or promises” was further evidence that his plea was voluntary); (“A guilty plea cannot be induced by unfulfilled or unfulfillable promises .

are issues of la w that [appellate courts] review de novo.” State v. 2 If a plea agreement is breached, a court “may allow withdrawal of the plea, order specific performance, or alter the sentence if appropriate.”

See State v. Brown , (“What the parties agreed to involves an issue of fact to be resolved by the district court.”); see also Dobbins v. State , (stating that factual findings will not be reversed unless clearly erroneous).

In order to determine whether the parties have honored a plea agreement, we first loo k to what the parties “reasonably understood to be th e terms of the agreement.” State v. Brown , d 670, 674 (Minn. 2000) (quotation omitted).

’” State v. Brown , , 674 (Minn. 2000) (alternation in original) (quoting United States v. Read, 778 F.2d 1437, 1441 (9th Cir. 1985)).

See State v. Brown , , 673 n.3 (Minn. 2000) (recognizing that a conditional-release term is a mandatory part of a sentence for certain offenses).

2, 750, 90 S. Ct. 1463, 1470 (1970) (“[A]gents of the State may not produce a plea by actual or threatened physical harm or by mental coercion overbearing the will of the defendant.”); Nelson v. State , (noting the fact that a defendant denied that he had been “subjected to threats or promises” was further evidence that his plea was voluntary); (“A guilty plea cannot be induced by unfulfilled or unfulfillable promises .

n.3 (Minn. 2000); see also Stone v. S tate, (stating that the conditional-release period that is required to be imposed on offenders convicted of criminal sexual conduct is part of the maximum sentence that an offender may receive for his crime).

Where a sentence is illegal and therefore invalidly imposed, the voluntariness of the plea is drawn into question.” State v. Brown , .