Cited by

(noting that whether to reserve jurisdiction over the issue of maintenance is within the district court’s discretion); (affirming the district court’s reservation of issues related to property division).

See Prahl v. Prahl , (stating that appellate courts “may treat statutory factors as addressed when they are implicit in the findings”); Eckman v. Eckman , (stating that the district court ’s failure to make a specific finding was not reversibl e error when it was implicit

(treating maintenance factors “as addressed when they are implicit in the findings”).

–06 (Minn. App. 2001) (concluding that, because the documentary evidence did not support respondent’s contention that nonmarital funds were applied to the homestead mortgage, respondent “failed to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that she had a nonmarital interest in the homestead”).

(noting that district court’s findings “implicitly indicate[d]” it found certain evidence credible); (stating that “[w]e may treat statutory factors as addressed when they are implicit in the findings”).

(recognizing implicit findings of fact); Vettleson v. Special Sch.

(noting that district court’s findings “implicitly indicate[d]” it found certain evidence credible); d 698, 703 (Minn. App. 2001) (stating that “[w]e may treat statutory factors as addressed when they are implicit in the findings”).

d 698, 703 (Minn. App. 2001) (stating that, in the context of a marriage dissolution proceeding, “[w]e may treat statutory factors as addressed when they are implicit in the 10 findings”); (stating that, in the context of a child-custody modification proceeding, t

(stating that “[w]e may treat statutory factors as addressed when they are implicit in the findings”); -59 (Minn. App. 1984) (affirming an actual damages determination that included implicit finding of expected yield of crop in “an amount within the mathem

d 698, 706-07 (Minn. App. 2001) (addressing a dissolution court’s division of an ownership interest in a business); (noting that “the shares themselves may be considered personal property, classifiable as marital or nonmarital”).

Wopata, d at 484; (stating that nonmarital asset commingled with marital asset may lose nonmarital status if not traceable to nonmarital source).

(stating that shares acquired by dividend reinvestment are marital property); Swick, d at 332- 33 (holding interest on certificate of deposit during marriage is income and thus marital property).

2 (2020).1 Weighing the factors requires the district court to conduct “a balancing of the recipient’s need against the obligor’s ability to pay.”

The weighing of the factors essen tially requires the district court to conduct “a balancing of the recipient’s need ag ainst the obligor’s ability to pay.” (-40 (Minn. 1982)).

The weighing of the factors essent ially requires the district court to conduct “a balancing of the recipient’s need ag ainst the obligor’s ability to pay.” Prahl v. Prahl , (M inn.

See Prahl v. Prahl , ( stating that “[w] e may treat statutory factors as addressed when they are implicit in the findings”).

“Whether to reserve jurisdiction over the issue of maintenance is within the district court’s discretion.”

This court “may treat statutory factors as addressed when they are implicit in the findings.”

Reservation of jurisdiction allows a district court to “later assess and address future changes in one party’s situation as those changes arise, without prematurely burdening the other party.”

“Whether to reserve jurisdiction over the issue of maintenance is [also] within the district court’s discretion.”

(citing Prahl v. Prahl , ), review denied (Minn. Dec.

Reservation permits a district court to “later assess and address future changes in one party’s situation as those changes arise, without prematurely burdening the other party.”

Determining the amount and duration of maintenance “is, in essence, a balancing of the recipient’s need against th e obligor’s ability to pay.”

The district court, in essence, balances “the recipient’s need against the obligor’s ability to pay.”

In essence, the district court balances “the recipient ’s need against the obligor ’s ability to pay.”

Bd., (quotation omitted) ; see Prahl v. Prahl , (“Because the district court, as the factfinder, is charged with reconciling conflicting evidence, the fact that the record might support findings other than those made by the district court does not show that the court ’s findings are defective.” (quotation omitted) ).

The district court, in essence, balances “the recipient’s need against the obligor’s ability to pay.”

“We will affirm a district court’s division of property if it has an acceptable basis in fact and principle even though this court may have taken a different approach.” ( quotation omitted).

In essence, the district court balances “the recipient’s needs against the obligor’s ability to pay.” (-40 (Minn. 1982)).

In essence, the district court balances “the recipient’s needs against the obligor’ s ability to pay.”

A district court abuses its discretion if it “resolve[s] the question in a manner that is against logic and the facts on record.” (quotation omitted).

(Minn. 1 Rubey also argues that the district court abused its discretion by reducing his parenting time below 25% without proper findings.

(stating that “[w]e may treat statutory factors as addressed when they are implicit in the findings.