Cited by

“A finding is clearly erroneous if the reviewing court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” (quotations omitted).

and determine[s] that it reasonably supports the findings”); (citing Wilson, d at 870, observing that “[t]here is sufficient evidence of record to support the [district] court’s findings that numerous best-interests factors favor neither party[,]” and concluding that, “[b]ecause the court’s findings are not clearly erroneous, it is unnecessary

in its amended J&D. On review, however, the law regarding custody and parenting time “leaves scant if any room for an appellate court to question the [district] court’s balancing of best-interests considerations.”

We “view[] the record in the light most favorable to the [district] court’s findings.”

There is “scant if any room for an appellate court to question the trial court’s balancing of best-interests considerations.”

(noting that in the context of child-custody matters, the law “leaves scant if any room for an appellate court to question the [district] court’s balancing of best-interests considerations”).

There is “scant if any room for an appellate court to question the trial court’s balancing of best-interests considerations.”

“A finding is clearly erroneous if the reviewing court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” 6 (quotations omitted).

3 Appellant relatedly contends that the district court demonstrated bias by allowing embellished or false testimony and by not disregarding falsified information in the OFP petition and in a police report.

-52 (Minn. App. 2023) (), rev. denied (Minn. Feb.

(noting that the law “leaves scant if any room” for us to question the balancing of best-interests considerations by the district court).

Appellate courts must defer to a district court’s credibility determinations, and cannot reweigh the evidence, reconcile conflicting evidence, or engage in new fact-finding, Kenney, d at 221-22.

d 468, 477 (Minn. App. 2000) (noting that the law “leaves scant if any room for an appellate court to question the [district] court’s balancing of best-interests considerations”).

(quotations and citation omitted); (discussing clear error standard of review in a similar fashion).

(noting that in the context of child-custody matters, the law “leaves scant if any room for an appellate court to question the [district] court’s balancing of best-interests considerations”).

Moreover, “appellate courts defer to [district] court credibility determinations,” meaning that we will not disturb the district court’s implicit finding that Mother ’s submissions were more persuasive than Father ’s. Our review of the record confirms that Mother’s affidavit supports the district court’s finding.

Husband challenges several of the district court’s factual findings as to the parties’ assets and the best interests of the children.1 “That the record might support findings other than those made by the [district] court does not show that the court’s findings are defective.” see In re Civ.

The court of appeals “views the record in the light most favorable to the [district] court’s findings” and does not “reweigh the evidence presented to the [district] court.” Vangsness v. Vangsness , 475 (Minn. App. 2000).

On appellate review of a district court’s best-interests analysis, “we give considerable deference to the district court’s findings.” , 477 (Minn. App. 2000) (“[C]urrent law leaves scant if any room for an appellate court to question the trial court’s balancing of best-interests considerations.”).

findings are defective.”

The Krugers argue that the district court erred by weighing the evidence because the evidence does not support the district courts determination, but it was the Krugers’ burden to prove all elements by clear and convincing evidence and “[w]e cannot reweigh the evidence presented to the [district] court.” (quotation omitted).

Kenney, d at 222 (quotations and citation omitted); 474 (Minn. App. 2000) (discussing the clear-error standard in a similar fashion).

Kenney, d at 222 (quotations and citation omitted); 474 (Minn. App. 2000) (similarly discussing the clear- error standard of review); (explaining that the district court’s “findings must be sustained unless clearly erroneous” and that “[d]eference must be given to the opportunity of the [district] court to asse

considerations.” -77 (Minn. App. 2000).

Kenney, d at 222 (quotations and citation omitted); 474 (Minn. App. 2000) (discussing the clear-error standard in a similar fashion).

Kenney, d at 222 (quotations and citation omitted); 474 (Minn. App. 2000) (similarly discussing the clear- error standard of review); (explaining that the district court’s “findings must be sustained unless clearly erroneous” and that “[d]eference must be given to the opportunity of the [district] court to asse

And “[i]ntent is a credibility question on which [this court] defer[s] to the [district] court.” Vangsness v. Vangsness

“A child ’s best interests are the 19 fundamental focus of custody decisions.”

Kenney, d at 222 (quotations and citation omitted); 474 (Minn. App. 2000) (discussing clear-error standard of review in a similar fashion).

“That the record might support findings other than those made by the trial court does not show that the court’s findings are defective.”

The law “leaves scant if any room for an appellate court to question the [district] court’s balancing of the best-interests considerations.”

at 222 (quotations omitted); see Bayer v. Bayer , (citing Kenney in family-law appeal); (discussing clear-error standard of review); WL 8361312, at *2 (Minn. App. Dec.

11 Kenney, d at 222 (quotations and citation omitted); 474 (Minn. App. 2000) (discussing clear error standard of review).