Cited by

-90 (Minn. 1987) (using eight factors to determine a “reasonable valuation” for a closely held corporation).

DECISION I. Husband raises two claims that are not properly before us. Husband first argues that the district court erred when it adopted wife’s proposed values of two businesses, Limpro Inc. and Northeast LLC , because it did not consider the Revenue-Ruling 59-60 -90 (Minn. 6 1987).

The duration of the award must be one that “the court deems just after considering all relevant factors.”

Antone, d at 102; n.7 (Minn. 1987) (noting that when determining the extent of the property interest acquired, the relevant amount of a payment does not include interest).

When this requires division of an asset, the district court has three options: (1) divide the asset; (2) order sale of the asset and division of the proceeds; or (3) “determine the value of the asset, order distribution of the entire asset to one of the parties, and order the recipient to pay to the other spouse a just and equitable share of the value of the asset.”

Husband contends that the district court erred in its valuation of Pemberton Homes because the district court’s -90 (Minn. 1987), did not address personal goodwill, and did not account for Husband’s importance in the business.

We stated that, as a general matter, “if a district court makes an award of temporary spousal maintenance in a dissolution decree, there is an ‘assumption that the party receiving the award not only should strive to obtain suitable employment and become self-supporting but that he or she will attain that goal.’” Madden, d at 697 ().

The court may do so by ordering (1) di vision of the assets in-kind, (2) sale of the assets and division of the proceeds of the sale, or (3) “distribution of the entire asset to one of the parties, and order[ing] the recipient to pay to the other spouse a just and equitable share of the value of the asset.”

Hecker v. Hecker , n.4 (Minn. 1997) (“[The supreme court has] recognized an implicit requirement that a temporary maintenance recipient make a reasonable effort to become self- supporting in accordance with the expectations of the parties.”) ().

While dissolutions following long-term marriage s inevitably create economic problems for both parties, and equal distribution is not required, “the bulk of the economic burden should not be visited on one party withou t regard to the parties’ standard of living during the marriage and without regard to that party’s now limited ability to [compete] in the labor market.”

“An award of temporary maintenance is based on the assumption that the party receiving the award not only should strive to obtain suitable employment and become self- supporting but that he or she will attain that goal.”

Permanent spousal maintenance is proper if “it is uncer tain that the spouse seeking maintenance can ever become self-supporting.” see Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd.

-99 (Minn. 1987); see Hecker, d at 709 (citing this aspect of Nardini).

d 184, 197 (Minn. 1987).

While Stefano has an obligation to try to become self-sufficient, see Hecker, 568 N.W2d at 710 n.4, it was well within the ambit of the district court’s discretion to decline to penalize Stef ano for failing to become self-sufficient less than half-way through the maintenance period.

Accordingly, an award of permanent spousal maintenance is proper if 11 “it is uncertain that the spouse seeking maintenance can ev er become self -supporting.”

As support for the latter argument, -89 (Minn. 1987).

” 50 (Minn. 2008) ; see also Gottsacker, d at 853

ourt has delineated three ways to dispose of marital property when the parties disagree: (1) the court can divide the asset; (2) the court can order sale and divide the proceeds; or (3) the court can determine the asset’s value, give one party the asset and require the party receiving the asset to pay the other party a “just and equitable share of the value of the asset.”

d 184, 188 (Minn. 1987).

post-dissolution positions” but also has stated that “the bulk of the economic burden should not be visited on o ne party without regard to the parties’ standard of living during the marriage.”

WL 4263161, at *7 ( 9 (Minn. App. 2009) ()).

*696 Nardini v. Nardini , , 198 (Minn. 1987).

(applying a clarifying amendment to a statute retroactively because the legislature “ clearly manifested its unmistakable intention ” for courts to do so).

192 (Minn. 1987) (citation omitted).

Nardini v. Nardini , , 192 (Minn. 1987).

But “the increase in the value of nonmarital property attributable to the ef forts of one or both spouses during their marriage, like the increase resulting from the application of marital funds, is marital property.” Nardini v. Nardini

Nardini v. Nardini , (“That the trial court retains jurisdiction over a temporary award does not make temporary maintenance an acceptable alternative when it is uncertain that the spouse seeking maintenance can ever become self-supporting.”).

A district court may divide marital property by dividing the asset in kind, ordering the sale of the asset and division of the proceeds, or “order[ing] distribution of the entire asset to one of the parties, a nd order[ing] the recipient to pay to the other spouse a just and equitable share of the value of the asset.”

review denied (Minn. Feb 24, 1988)