Cited by

d 179, 183 (Minn. App. 2011) (applying a prima facie case analysis to a motion to restrict parenting time).

–31 (Minn. App. 2018) ().

-85 (Minn. App. 2011) (applying prima facie case analysis to motion to restrict parenting time).

at 568-70 (reviewing de novo whether district court applied correct standard in making that determination); (stating that appellate courts review de novo whether an evidentiary hearing is warranted on custody-modification motion).

-69 (Minn. 2006); (stating that appellate courts review de novo whether an evidentiary hearing is warranted on custody-modification motion).

That reduction, coupled with the other constraints, are substantial changes to [mother’s] parenting time and, therefore, are considered restrictions under the law.” While not all reductions in parenting time constitute restrictions, a restriction “can occur when a change to parenting time is substantial.” n.1 (Minn. App. 2011) (quotation omitted) ; see also Suleski, d at 336 (noting that because the reason for the reduction in the mother’s parenting time in that case was not a defect in that mot

Amarreh, d at 230- 31 (); see Szarzynski, d at 292 (noting that allegations that are conclusory, vague, or devoid of support in the record are insufficient to make a prima facie case); (stating, in the context of a motion to intervene, that “the court

d. 5(c)(1) (2022), the district court may restrict parenting time if it finds that “parenting time is likely to endanger the child’ s physical or emotional health or impair the child’s emotional development.” “In addressing a motion to restrict parenting time, the district court applies the analytical framework that was developed for evaluating a motion to modify custody.”

See In re Welfare of L.L.P., 8 ( as the one for reviewing the denial, without an evidentiary hearing, of a motion for an adoptive placement).

-83 14 (Minn. App. 2011).

(citing Boland v. Murtha , ).

“When statutes explicitly entrust the district court to determine what is appropriat e, we review for an abuse of discretion.” (stating that, in the contexts of motions to restrict parenting time and motions to modify custody, “we review de novo whether the district court properly treated the alle gations in the moving party’s affidavits as true” and “we review for an abuse of discretion the district court’s determi

Amarreh, d at 230-31 (-85 (Minn. App. 2011)).

(citing Boland v. Murtha , ).

While not all reductions in parenting time constitute restrictions, a restriction “can occur when a change to parenting time is substantial.” d 179, 182 n.1 (Minn. App. 2011) (quotation omitted).

d 179, 183 (Minn. App. 2011).

On appeal from an order denying , without an evidentiary hearing, a motion to modify custody, the court “review [s] three discrete determinations.” Boland v. Murtha

First, “we review de novo whether the district court properly treated the allegations in the moving party’s affidavits as true, disregarded the contrary allegations in the nonmovin g party’s affidavits, and considered only the explanatory allegations in the nonmoving party’s affidavits.” 7 (Minn. App. 2011).

see In re Welfare of Children of L.L.P.

The district court must assume the allegations are true but has discretion to determine “whether the moving party has made a prima facie showing for the modification.” Boland v. Murtha

d 179, 185 (Minn. App. 2011).

d 179, 184-85 (Minn. 2011).

Boland v. Murtha , , 183 (Minn. App. 2011).

Boland v. Murtha , 185 (Minn. App. 2011), review denied (Minn. Oct.

ification of custody made a prima facie case, “the district court must accept the facts in the moving party’s affidavits as true, disregard the contrary allegations in the nonmoving party’s affidavits, and consider the allegations in the nonmoving party’s affidavits only to the extent they explain or contextualize the allegations contained in the moving party’s affidavits.”