Cited by

d 914, 920 (Minn. 2019); see also Minn. Stat. § 645.17(2) (2020) (noting that the Legislature is presumed to intend that “the entire statute .

Partners III -Lofts, LLC, (stating that we must follow the language of a statute when it is plain); State v. Pakhnyuk , (stating that statutory language “is not examined in isolation; rather, all provisions in the statute must be read and interpreted as whole”).

19, 2019); (stating that the state bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt a defendant’s violation of a criminal statute).

“If, after considering these principles, we conclude that the statute is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation, then it is ambiguous.” (quotation omitted).

(providing that the state must prove every element of a charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt).

d 914, 920 (Minn. 2019).

We must not read a statutory provision in isolation, but “rather, all provisions in the statute must be read and interpreted as a whole.”

(holding that if the meaning of a statute is unambiguous, then the plain language of the statute controls).

see also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).

“The statutory language in dispute is not examined in isolation; rather, all provisions in the stat ute must be read and interpreted as whole.”

But we review de novo sufficiency-of-the-e vidence claims that only present a question of statutory interpretation “on the meaning of the statute under which a defendant has been convicted.” State v. Pakhnyuk

canons of interpretation are to govern, unless their observance would involve a construction incons istent with the manifest intent of the legislature, or repugnant to the context of the statute.”); see also State v. Pakhnyuk

usive or unwanted acts, words, or gestures.” This interpretation of subdivision 1(a)(1) is also supported by application of the well-accepted rule of grammar known as th e “last-antecedent rule.” Under the last-antecedent rule, “a concluding modifier in a series applies only to the nearest reasonable element in the seri es, rather than to every element in the series.” ( Pakhnyuk II).

To 9 determine whether a statute is ambiguous, we analyze “the statute’s text, structure, and punctuation.”

(considering legislative history only after finding the statute ambiguous); State v. Altepeter , (noting that an “illogical” result is only considered if the statute is ambiguous); (stating that the canon of

d 914, 920 (Minn. 2019) .

See, d 914, 920 (Minn. 2019) (applying de novo review to a claim that challenged the sufficiency of the evidence that depended on the meaning of the statute); d 616, 620 (Minn. 1995) (stating that “whether evidence is sufficient to prove an overt act” as required by a statute “is a legal question and i

State v. Pakhnyuk , see State v. Riggs , d 679, 682 n.3 (Minn. 2015) (distinguishin g between pre-ambiguity “canons of interpretation” and post-ambiguity “canons of construction”).

raises essentially the same argument on appeal that he present ed to the jury at trial: that he was not guilty of a crime.”

See State v. Pakhnyuk , 5 (Minn. 2019).

“A statute is ambiguous if it is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation.” State v. Pakhnyuk , aff’d

-919 (Minn. 2019) (explaining that defendant who challenges sufficiency of evidence raises essentially same argument on appeal as presented to jury at trial, that he was not guilty).

When interpreting a statute, words and phrases are “construed according to the rules of grammar and according to their common and approved usage.” (quo tation omitted).

–23 (Minn. 2019) (concluding that the last-antecedent rule was “not helpful in ascertaining the meaning” of a criminal statute because of the divided structure of the statutory elements, which were three numbered elements separated by semicolons and line breaks); –98

When interpreting a statute, words and phrases are “construed according to the rules of grammar and according to their common and approved usage.” State v. Pakhnyuk , (quotation omitted).

“When interpreting a statute, the first question is whether the language of a statute is ambiguous.” d 914, 920 (Minn. 2019).