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5 In State v. Pike, the supreme court held that an officer may lawfully stop a vehicle “if the officer knows that the owner of the vehicle has a revoked license, so long as the officer remains unaware of any facts which would render unreasonable an assumption that the owner is driving the vehicle.”

traffic laws need not be detectable.”

However, “[a]n actual violation of the vehicle and traffic laws need not be detectable.”

An officer may conduct a brief stop and investigation only if they have reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity, meaning that the stop cannot be “the product of mere whim, caprice or idle curiosity.” -22 (Minn. 1996).

ense plate and details at the scene corroborated the 911 call , including the location of Duta’s vehicle and the presence of another vehicle parked near Duta’s. 6 An officer may conduct a brief stop and investigation only if they have reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity, meaning that the stop cannot be “the product of mere whim, caprice or idle curiosity.” -22 (Minn. 1996).

(holding that “the knowledge that the owner of a vehicle has a revoked license is enough to form the basis of a ‘reasonable suspicion of criminal activity’ when an officer observes the vehicle being driven”).

Cf. Anderson, d at 824 (concluding that the officer lacked a reasonable, articulable suspicion for a stop because his interpretation of the law was erroneous, and he therefore lacked a particularized and objective basis for stopping the driver); d 823, 825 (Minn. 2001) (-22 (Minn. 1996)) (explaining that “it is not necessary that the police detect an actual violation of the law” to conduct an investigatory stop).

An officer may conduct a brief stop and investigation only if reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity exists, meaning that the initial stop cannot be “the product of mere whim, caprice or idle curiosity.” d 919, 921- 22 (Minn. 1996).

To meet the reasonable , articulable suspicion standard, an officer must “show that the stop was not the product of mere whim, caprice or idle curiosity , but was based upon ‘specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reaso nably warrant that intrusion.’” State v. Pike , - 22 (Minn. 1996) (quoting Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) ).

traffic laws need not be detectable.”

–22 (Minn. 1996) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21–22 (1968)).

A seizure requires reasonable, articulable suspicion of a violation of law , Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19- 22 (1968), while a seizure amounting to an arrest generally requires probable cause, State v. Pike , .

(“A brief investigatory stop requires only reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, rather than probable cause.”).

But the “actual violation of the vehicle and traffic laws need not be detectable.” -22 (Minn. 1996).

-22 (Minn. 1996) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 21).

traffic laws need not be detectable”; instead, the police “must only show that the stop was not the product of mere whim, caprice or idle curiosity, but was based upon ‘specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.’” - 22 (Minn. 1996) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21).

“A brief investigatory stop requires only reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, rather than probable cause.”

(citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 21).

But the stop must be based on more than “whim, caprice, or idle curiosity.”

Such stops must be based on more than “whim, caprice, or idle cur iosity.” State v. Pike , .

Knights, 534 U.S. at 121, 122 S. Ct. at 592; (stating that a brief investigative seizure of any person is permissible upon a showing of reasonable suspicion).

Vondrachek v. Comm’r of Pub.

A stop must not be “the product of mere whim, caprice, or idle curiosity.”

The seizure cannot be based on “mere whim, caprice or idle curiosity.”

Knowledge of a registered owner’s revoked driver’s license is enough to provide an officer with a reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop a vehicle as long as the officer remains “unaware of facts which would render unreasonable the assumption that the owner is driving the vehicle.” (emphasis added).

The reasonable-suspicion standard is not a high one, State v. Diede , 3 (Minn. 2011), but the investigatory stop may not be the result of “mere whim, caprice or idle curiosity,” -22 (Minn. 1996).

However, the investigatory stop may not be the result of “mere whim, caprice or idle curiosity.” -22 (Minn. 1996).

The reasonable-suspicion standard is not high, State v. Diede , 3 (Minn. 2011), but the investigatory stop may not be the result of “mere whim, caprice or idle curiosity,”

Reasonable, articulable suspicion requires that the stop is “not the product of mere whim, caprice or idle curiosity.”

The intrusion must not be the “product of mere w h i m , c a p r i c e o r i d l e curiosity, but [be] based upon ‘ specific and articulable facts which, taken together with 6 rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.’” -22 (Minn. 1996) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S. Ct. at 1880).

A limited investigative sto p is lawful if the state demonstrates that the officer had a “particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.”

To demonstrate reasonable, articulable suspicion, polic e must show that the stop was “not the product of mere whim, caprice or idle curiosity, but was based upon ‘specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational infer ences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.’” -22 (Minn. 1996) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880 (1968)).

State v. Timberlake , d 390, 393 (Minn. 2008) ; see also State v. Pike , -22 (Minn. 1996) (noting that an investigative stop of a vehicle is lawful if the state can show that the officer had a “particularized and objective basis” for suspecting criminal activity ) (quotation omitted).

I t cannot be based on a “hunch” or be “the product of mere whim, caprice or idle curiosity.” Id.; - 22 (Minn. 1996) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S. Ct. at 1880).

the supreme court considered the validity of an investigatory stop of a vehicle that was based on an officer’s knowledge that the owner of the vehicle had a revoked driver’s license.