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Indeed, it is well settled that “[c]ourts favor stipulations in dissolution cases as a means of simplifying and expediting litigation, and to bring resolution to what frequently has become an acrimonious relationship between the parties.”

(recognizing that, “even though we treat dissolution stipulations as contracts, they have unique features”); (stating that the “sole relief” from a stipulated J&D “lies in meeting the requirements of Minn. Stat. 7 § 518.145, subd.

2 (2024); see Shirk v. Shirk , (“The 6 sole relief from the judgment and decree lies in meeting the requirements of Minn. Stat. § 518.145, subd.

atute section 518.145, subdivision 1 (2024), which provides that “[a] decree of dissolution of marriage or of legal separation is final when entered, subject to the right of appeal.” Generally, because of a desire for finality, “[r]elief from a judgment and decree of divorce based upon a stipulation of the parties is 7 available only under Minn. Stat. § 518.145 [(1996)].” 522 (Minn. 1977).

Stipulations in dissolution proceedings are favored by courts “as a means of simplifying and expeditin g litigation” and “are therefore accorded the sanctity of binding contract s.” Shirk v. Shirk, 9

(holding that the stipulation “merges” with the final judgment and decree and that the “sole relief” from the judgment is to satisfy section 518.145, subdivision 2); see also Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd.

“Courts favor stipulations in dissolution cases as a means of simplifying and expediting litigation, and to bring resolution to what frequently has become an acrimonious relationship between the parties.”

6 I. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying wife’s motion to reopen the parties’ stipulated J&D. Wife first challenges the district court’s denial of her motion to reopen the stipulated J&D. The use of stipulations in dissolution proceedings is a judicially favored “means of simplifying and expediting litigation.”

29, 2024); (“[W]hen a judgment and decree is entered based upon a stipulation, we hold that the stipulation is merged into the judgment and decree and the stipulation cannot thereafter be the target of attack by a party seeking relief from the judgment and decree.”).

2 (2022) (setting forth limited grounds for reopening a judgment and decree); Shirk v. Shirk , (“The sole relief from the judgment and decree lies in meeting the requirements of Minn. Stat. § 518.145, subd.

(distinguishing a “stipulation” as something that “represents the parties’ voluntary acquiescence in an equitable settlement” from a stipulation that “has been merged into the judgment and decree”); - 22 (Minn. 1997) (noting that stipulations are “accorded the sanctity of binding contracts” and “cannot be repudiated or withdrawn from [by] one party without the consent of the other, except by leave of the court for cause shown,” but that “upon entry of a judgment and decree based on a stipulation

2 (2022) (setting forth limited grounds for reopening a judgment and decree); (“The sole relief from the judgment and decree lies in meeting the requirements of Minn. Stat. § 518.145, subd.

Whether a signed agreement, later used as the basis for a district court’s final order, is properly a subject of a

DECISION “Courts favor stipulations in dissolution cases as a means of simplifying and expediting litigation, and to bring resolution to what frequently has become an acrimonious relationship between the parties.” .

-22 (Minn. 1997) (holding that “when a judgment and decree is entered based upon a stipulation, we hold that the 10 stipulation is merged into the judgment and decree and the stipulation cannot thereafter be the target of attack by a party seeking relief from the judgment and decree”); see also Toughill v. T

21, 2001); d 519, 522 (Minn. 1997).

2.” d 519, 522 (Minn. 1997); (quoting this aspect of Shirk).

2.” see Pooley v. Pooley , (quoting this aspect of Shirk).

ANALYSIS Marriage-dissolution stipulations are a judicially favored means of simplifying and expediting dissolution litigation and are “accorded the sanctity of binding contracts.”

(stating that “[t]he sole relief from the judgment and decree lies in meeting the requirements of Minn. Stat. § 518.145, subd.

2(2) (2020), the district court may grant a party’s timely motion to reopen a judgment and decree based on “newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under the Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 59.03.”2 Section 518.145, subdivision 2, provides the “sole relief from the judgment and decree.”

“Courts favor stipulations in dissolution cases as a me ans of simplifying and expediting litigation, and to bring resolution to what frequently has become an acrimonious relationship between the parties.”

Shirk v. Shirk , (citing Minn. Stat. § 518.145, subd.

Although courts favor stipulated agreements in dissolution cases, the district court may refuse to accept all or some terms of a stipulated agreement, n.1 (Minn. App. 2000).

As a result, the stipulation became part of the order, and “cannot thereafter be the target of attack by a party seeking relief.” Shirk v. Shirk

We are mindful that “[c]ourts favor stipulations in dissolution cases as a means of simplifying and expediting litigation, and to bring resolution to what frequently has become an acrimonious relationship between the parties.”

“First, the party can seek to withdraw from or vacate the stipulation upon which the proposed judgment is based.” Clark v. Clark , ; see Shirk v. Shirk , -22 (Minn. 1997) (addressing a party’s ability to withdraw from a stipulation); (same) .

“Stipulations are therefore accorded the sanctity of binding contracts.”

(“The sole relief from the judgment and decree lies in meeting th e requirements of Minn. Stat. § 518.145, subd.

The supreme court calls this difference between the statute and the rule “significant[].” n.3 (Minn. 1997).

“Stipulations are therefore accorded the sanctity of binding contracts.”