Cited by

To be constitutional, a warrantless seizure “must fall within one of the well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement.”

d 128, 135 (Minn. 1999).

the police must have reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity.”

th e police must have reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity.”

Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809 (1996) (quotation omitted); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) (“[I]n justifying the particular intrusion the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.”).

(citing Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968) ).

A warrantless search is per se unreasonable unless it satisfies “one of the well - delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement.”

(quotations omitted); see also Davis, d at 182 (“[T]he officer must be able to point to something that objectively supports the suspicion at issue.” (quotation omitted)); (“[T]he police need only show that the stop was not the product of mere whim, caprice, or idle curiosity.” (quotation omitted)).

6 (Minn. 1999) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880 (1968)).

For the search to be constitutional, therefore, it “must fall within one of the well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement.” State v. Munson

For the search and seizure to be constitutional, therefore, they “must fall within one of the well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement.”

675, 686, 105 S. Ct. 1568, 1575 (1985); Flowers, d at 253; -38 (Minn. 1999).

d 128, 136 (Minn. 1999) (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 22, 88 S. Ct. at 1880).

A search conducted without a warrant is unreasonable unless it satisfies “one of the well - delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement.”

On the other hand, in State v. Munson , officers stopped a vehicle that was suspected to contain a large amount of drugs, ordered two occupants out of the vehicle, and temporarily handcuffed them while the officers determined that they were not armed and dangerous, at which point the handcuffs were removed .

(corroboration); McCloskey, d at 704 (voluntariness and statements against interest); (informant history).

State v. Munson , (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880 (1968)).

(“ Under this ‘motor vehicle exception, ’ the police may search an automobile without a warrant if they have ‘probable cause for believing that [the] vehicles are carrying contraband or illegal merchandise.

A search conducted without a warrant is generally per se unreasonable unless it satisfies “one of the well -delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement.”

Once it has been established that an individual invoked his right to counsel, “courts may admit responses t o further questioning only on finding that the accused (a) initiated further discussions with the police, and (b) knowingly and intelligently waived the right invoked.” State v. Munson , -39 (Minn. 1999) (quotation omitted).

.” see also State v. Moffatt , (holding that a stop was not deemed a de facto arrest even when officers frisked the suspects for weapons and placed them in separate squad cars).

(citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880 (1968)).

“The U.S. Supreme Court has held that ‘[i]f probable cause justifies the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search.’” (quoting United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 2 157 (1982)).

d 128, 136 (Minn. 1999).

State v. Munson , (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880 (1968))

Reasonable suspicion justifies a stop “so long as the facts support at least one inference of the possibility of criminal activity,” (quotation omitted), and it is not “the product of mere whim, caprice, or idle curiosity.” (quotation omitted).

“Whether the information provided by a confidential informant is sufficient to establish probable cause is determined by examining the totality of the circumstances, particularly ‘the cred ibility and veracity of the informant.’” –04 (Minn. App. 2004) ().

(citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968))

See State v. Ortega , ; State v. Robb , 6 ; (stating that brief handcuffing does not necessarily constitute an arrest).

(citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 -22, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880 (1968)).

(citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968))

(citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968)).

(citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880 (1968)).

(holding that frisking, handcuffing, and placing multiple individuals in the rear of squad cars was not an arrest, and were “reasonable steps taken by the officers to saf ely conduct their investigation”).

(citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21- 22, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1879-80 (1968)).

“[B]riefly handcuffing a suspect while the police sort out the scene of an investigation does not per se transform an investigatory detention into an arrest, nor does placing the suspect in the back of a squad car while the investigation proceeds.”

State v. Munson , (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880 (1968))