Cited by

Klingelhoets asserted that the district court was required to “apply the same standard [that] appellate courts use to review challenges to the sufficiency of evidence,” that the charged 6 “counts [were] based on circumstantial evidence,” and that “there [were] several reasonable hypotheses othe

Citing the court of appeals’ Firkus argues the district court should have applied the circumstantial-evidence standard that 37 appellate courts use when reviewing the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence after a jury has returned a guilty verdict.

Cf. Harris, d at 602-03 (reversing conviction of appellant who drove car registered to someone else with three passengers who had access to firearm); -36 (Minn. App. 6 2015) (reversing conviction of appellant who drove borrowed vehicle with contraband in glove compartment).

We must “look at the circumstances proved not 6 as isolated facts but rather as a complete chain that, in view of the evidence as a whole, leads so directly to the guilt of the defendant as to exclude any reasonable inference other than guilt.” (quotation omitted).

Though an inference inconsistent with guilt need not be the most likely inference, appellate courts “will not overturn a guilty verdict on conjecture alone,”

.” (emphasis added) (quotation omitted); (concluding the Al-Naseer standard applies to a motion for a judgment of acquittal).

( ) (stating that the district court is “ required to apply the Al-Naseer/Silvernail analysis” to decide a motion for judgment of acquittal in a circumstanti

“[T]here is sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction if and only if no other reasonable, rational inferences exist that are inconsistent with guilt.” (quotation omitted).

d 825 (Minn. App. 2015), and Harris, to support the assertion that the circumstances proved are consistent with an alternative hypothesis of his innocence.

We review the district court’s determination of guilt de novo based on its findings of fact, and we review its findings of fact for clear error, d 320, 334 (Minn. 2010).

11, 2016) (discussing Minn. Stat. § 609.672 and cited for its persuasive value), aff’d, n.4 (Minn. App. 2015) (discussing Minn. Stat. § 152.028).

( ; ) (stating that the district court is required to apply the Al-Naseer/Silvernail analysis to decide a motion for judgment of acquittal in a circumstantia

We have historically upheld “convictions based on circumstantial evidence of possession of contraband” where the record includes “evidence tying a defendant directly to the illegal items.”

Our review therefore consists of “a painstaking analysis of the record to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most 1 “[C]onstructive possession need not be exclusive, but may be shared.” (quotation omitted).

Because constructive possession can be joint, speculation that another person also may have possessed the gun does not establish a reasonable inference other than guilt.

Notably, “[a] defendant may possess an item jointly with another person.” Id.; (explaining that constructive possession may be shared).

In State v. Sam , this court held that when a district court considers a motion for judgment of acquittal, the court “must apply the same standard appellate courts use to review challenges to sufficiency of the evidence.”

Given these circumstances, — where we found insufficient circumstantial evidence to support a drug conviction — requires reversal here.

Appellant argues that his case is like State v. Sam , and State v. Harris

-36 (Minn. App. 2015) (identifying methods by which the state can eliminate other rational hypotheses inconsistent with guilt in contraband cases).

In addition to arguing that secondary transfer provides a rea sonable inference inconsistent with guilt, Taylor relies on two cases to support his conclusion that the state failed to prove h e constructively possessed the firearms: Harris, d at 592

n.4 (Minn. App. 2015) (observing that section 152.028 did not change the court’s Silvernail analysis in that case).

d at 601; (recognizing that “[ p]roximity is an important consideration in assessing constructive possession”) (quotation omitted); (c oncluding defendant constructively possessed drugs, found near his passport, located in a bedroom of a shared

for his argument that driving a vehicle in which controlled substances were found does not establish that he possessed the substan ces.

at 601; (stating that “constructive possession need not be exclusive, but may be shared” (quotation omitted)).

For cases involv ing the possession of contraba nd, this court will uphold a conviction based on circumstan tial evidence only when there is “evidence tying a defendant directly to the illegal items.”

Medina argues that courts generally have “upheld convictions based on circumstantial evidence” only wh en there is “evidence tying a defendant directly to the illegal items.”

d 825, 833 (Minn. App. 2015).

at 611; -34 (Minn. App. 2015).

To support his argument, appellant relies on State v. Sam , and Harris.

See State v. Salyers , , 160 (Minn. 2015) (establishing constructive possession by direct evidence); State v. Sam , , 832 (Minn. App. 2015) (establishing constructive possession by circumstantial evidence).